Disputing research that depicts weak states getting overwhelmed by China's financial might, this article argues that the political elites in a relatively weak and small state such as Malaysia are adept in engaging with a rising China to advance key projects, furthering their own agenda. In the case of Malaysia, the eventual outcome of this interaction is dependent on three key conditions: fulfilment of Malaysia's longstanding pro-ethnic Malay policy, a mutual vision between the state and federal authorities, and advancement of geopolitical interests for both Malaysia and China. The article puts forward a typology illustrating various possible outcomes to examine the interconnections between key players at a time of Chinese ascendancy. The Belt and Road Initiative from a Southeast Asian perspective In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced a pair of initiatives, which aims to restructure the economies spanning Europe and Asia. The 'Silk Road Economic Belt' was announced in September 2013 in Kazakhstan as a program to connect China to Europe by land, with routes interlinking relevant countries. A month later, in Indonesia, President Xi announced the '21 st Century Maritime Silk Road', a maritime development initiative targeting the ports of Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, East Africa, and the Mediterranean. These two Silk Road programs collectively form the 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI). It has become China's foremost diplomatic and economic strategy in engaging with neighbouring countries and beyond since 2013. The investment associated with the BRI has surpassed US$1 trillion and will continue to define China's relationship with the world. 1 Although BRI is a China-driven strategy, unlike other national plans (such as developing the Western regions or Xibu Dakaifa) that fall within the domestic political economy of China, its operation and success (or failure) depends fundamentally upon the engagement with and response from countries alongside the BRI nations (numbering more than 60). Existing studies on BRI has focused almost exclusively on China's interests and strategies, giving little attention to the responses of small states, such as those from Southeast Asia. 2 Echoing Blanchard and Mohan Malik, this article reaffirms the critical role that Southeast Asia plays in the BRI for it is one of the most critical areas making up the 21 st Century Maritime Silk Road. 3 It goes beyond a macro-level CONTACT Guanie Lim

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This article argues that Singapore, courtesy of its strong state capacity and long-standing connections with China, has promoted effective polices and coordinated mutually reinforcing institutional mechanisms in engaging with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While some of these institutions predate the BRI, they have been continuously enhanced or modified to meaningfully foster Singapore-China cooperation. In certain cases, new institutions have been created to fulfill specific demands the existing institutions cannot adequately serve. These two types of institutions not only complement each other but also promote cooperation between the bureaucrats, politicians, transnational corporations, government-linked corporations, small- and medium-sized private firms and business associations. The article also illustrates the flexibility of the ‘networked state’ in formulating collaborative ties linking key international and domestic actors, demonstrating how a small state like Singapore can partner China effectively and deepen its strategic importance to the BRI to enhance its own strategic and economic interests. Lastly, the article highlights the two key conditions in BRI-related nations for their successful engagement: the existence of mutual interests between China and a counterpart nation bolstered by conducive perceptions and policies, and the institutionalization of competent mechanisms to materialize and operationalize these interests.