The Political Economy of a Rising China in Southeast Asia: Malaysia’s Response to the Belt and Road Initiative

Abstract

Disputing research that depicts weak states getting overwhelmed by China's financial might, this article argues that the political elites in a relatively weak and small state such as Malaysia are adept in engaging with a rising China to advance key projects, furthering their own agenda. In the case of Malaysia, the eventual outcome of this interaction is dependent on three key conditions: fulfilment of Malaysia's longstanding pro-ethnic Malay policy, a mutual vision between the state and federal authorities, and advancement of geopolitical interests for both Malaysia and China. The article puts forward a typology illustrating various possible outcomes to examine the interconnections between key players at a time of Chinese ascendancy. The Belt and Road Initiative from a Southeast Asian perspective In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced a pair of initiatives, which aims to restructure the economies spanning Europe and Asia. The 'Silk Road Economic Belt' was announced in September 2013 in Kazakhstan as a program to connect China to Europe by land, with routes interlinking relevant countries. A month later, in Indonesia, President Xi announced the '21 st Century Maritime Silk Road', a maritime development initiative targeting the ports of Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, East Africa, and the Mediterranean. These two Silk Road programs collectively form the 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI). It has become China's foremost diplomatic and economic strategy in engaging with neighbouring countries and beyond since 2013. The investment associated with the BRI has surpassed US$1 trillion and will continue to define China's relationship with the world. 1 Although BRI is a China-driven strategy, unlike other national plans (such as developing the Western regions or Xibu Dakaifa) that fall within the domestic political economy of China, its operation and success (or failure) depends fundamentally upon the engagement with and response from countries alongside the BRI nations (numbering more than 60). Existing studies on BRI has focused almost exclusively on China's interests and strategies, giving little attention to the responses of small states, such as those from Southeast Asia. 2 Echoing Blanchard and Mohan Malik, this article reaffirms the critical role that Southeast Asia plays in the BRI for it is one of the most critical areas making up the 21 st Century Maritime Silk Road. 3 It goes beyond a macro-level CONTACT Guanie Lim

Geoeconomics, easy money, and political opportunism: the Perils under China and Japan’s high-Speed rail competition

“…Beijing first agreed to purchase Malaysian government bonds and a debt-ridden 1MDB-owned power supply asset (Venkat & Carew, 2015). Chinese state-owned firms invested in ETP-designated infrastructure projects across several electorally important states, a move that many view could help Najib gain support from local elites (Liu & Lim, 2019;Weiss, 2020). Particularly, China Railway Corp purchased a sixty percent stake in Bandar Malaysiathe proposed KL-Singapore HSR terminusin an effort to inject cash to the financially distressed 1MDB.…”

“…Importantly, in recent years, a stream of new literature emphasising the 'Global South' perspective (Acharya, 2014) is on the rise against the backdrop of increased challenges and complications surrounding Chinese, and to a lesser extent, Japanese, financed infrastructure projects in developing Asia. In complementing macro-level analysis on state-to-state relations in the geopolitical context, this literature analyses domestic conditions in recipient countries, including elite politics, the formation of political coalitions, and political institutions, and how these conditions affect choices and outcomes related to Chinese or Japanese-financed projects in developing Asia (Aiyara, 2019;Camba, 2020;Liu & Lim, 2019).…”

Introduction : Réponses aux nouvelles routes de la soie chinoises

“…Tout d'abord, la bri a des implications de taille pour l'évolution du droit international (Zhao Yun 2018). D'autre part, le projet chinois dépend de son acceptation par les pays de la région (Liu et Lim 2018). Enfin, la bri représente un défi majeur pour la politique étrangère même de la Chine, qui, jusqu'à Xi Jinping, se donnait pour mot d'ordre, hérité de Deng Xiaoping, de mener profil bas sur la scène internationale.…”

Singapore Engages the Belt and Road Initiative: Perceptions, Policies, and Institutions

“…Six years after the BRI's promulgation, there remains relatively little research on how (small-to medium-sized) states, such as those from Southeast Asia which occupies a key place in the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, engages with the BRI in advancing their own national interests (cf. Liu and Lim, 2019;Tong and Kong, 2018;Kratz and Pavlićević, 2019;Khoo, 2019;Teo, EC, 2019;Ba, 2019). Much of the existing analysis has focused almost exclusively on the interests and strategies of Chinese political and economic actors (see Liou, 2014;Yoshimatsu, 2018;Beeson, 2016).…”

“…Much of the existing analysis has focused almost exclusively on the interests and strategies of Chinese political and economic actors (see Liou, 2014;Yoshimatsu, 2018;Beeson, 2016). Extending Liu and Lim's (2019) as well as Kratz and Pavlićević's (2019) work on Malaysia and Indonesia, respectively, this article studies how a small (yet important) state such as Singapore manages its interactions with China as well as the BRI by skilfully incorporating domestic political economy factors with China's growing presence in the region. Going beyond a macro-level analysis, it adopts a mesoscale perspective to take into account diverse economic, political, societal interests, and more importantly, the fluid interplay among these factors.…”