No abstract

In seeking to understand IMF lending early large sample econometric studies tended to focus on economic factors. Political and institutional influences were often deemed to be reflected in the frequently large residual. At the same time increasing anecdotal evidence was being amassed to suggest that political factors were indeed important. However, more recent studies have claimed that, by using superior estimating techniques, a satisfactory explanation of Fund lending can be provided without needing to include political and institutional factors, which are in any case difficult to measure and model. This study shows that there is large sample evidence supporting the importance of some of these variables, though their contribution to predicting the pattern of IMF agreements is minimal. It goes on to discuss some of the implications of this for the Fund as the world's premier international financial institution. The research upon which this paper is based was supported by the UK Department for International Development (DFID). While this support is gratefully acknowledged, the views and opinions expressed are those of the authors alone. Thanks to Chris Worswick and two anonymous referees for comments, and Connie Tulus and Helgi Maki for research assistance.

It has frequently been assumed that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) plays an important catalysing role in mobilizing international capital for developing countries and countries in transition. The Fund has conventionally been depicted as a "gatekeeper" that unlocks financial flows from other sources, particularly private international capital markets. However, more recently, international financial crises have highlighted the problem of capital volatility and have led to calls for reform of the international financial architecture and, as part of this, the IMF. Unfortunately, basic questions about the interaction between current institutional arrangements and international capital markets have yet to be answered. How do international capital markets react to the activities of the IMF? Do the reactions of private and public lenders differ? Have their reactions changed over time? Do market responses depend on country characteristics and on the type of IMF involvement and, if so, how? This paper addresses these questions and goes on to discuss the policy implications that arise.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is the world's premier international financial institution with 184 member countries and active programmes in a significant number of them at any one time. The Fund attracts a great deal of attention, much of it critical. But the discussion is often polemic in style. Strongly held, but frequently opposing, views are expressed. This survey attempts to examine, in an objective way, the theory and evidence relating to the Fund's operations. Many aspects of the empirical research are relatively recent and a universal consensus is yet to emerge; as a consequence there is scope for disagreement to persist. However, the research is also gradually clarifying many important issues. The format for the survey is to examine the life cycle of IMF arrangements. What makes a country turn to the Fund for assistance? Should the IMF be lending? What influences the outcome of negotiations and the design of programmes? Are IMF programmes effective? And why do some countries make prolonged use of IMF resources? For completeness there is also some discussion of the history of the IMF, the extent to which Fund policies have been influenced by advances in economic theory and the Fund's systemic role. Important organisational and governance issues are also covered briefly. Although primarily adopting an economist's perspective, the survey reflects the growing recognition that in order to understand the IMF's operations, economics has to be combined with politics. Examining the IMF is an exercise in applied political economy.

This paper has a number of purposes. First, it revisits the older theory of reserve adequacy and optimality to see whether this can still be used and perhaps strengthened in ways that would inform the current debate. Second, it explores the connection between reserve adequacy and currency crisis in the light of recent experience and empirical research. Third, it critically investigates alternative rule-of-thumb measures of reserve adequacy. Fourth, and drawing on the foregoing analysis, it examines the extent to which crisis countries should seek to replenish and build up their international reserves in the post-crisis period. Additional owned reserves represent a guaranteed and unconditional source of liquidity; is this what is needed?

No abstract

The movement of immature insects up down and across Salem Creek, Ontario, was measured with traps and nets at two week intervals from January to December 1977. Drift of most taxa was more strongly correlated with water velocity from August to December than it was over the whole year. That of Baetis, however, was not correlated with water velocity and it was significantly greater at the side of the stream than at the centre from May to July. Upstream movement, as measured in three different ways, was small compared with drift, being only 2.1, 7.3 and 15.2 percent respectively.Upstream and across stream movements were not consistently different from one another, changes in their intensity apparently merely representing changes in numbers and behaviour of the animals. It is concluded therefore that upstream movement is only random movement.Colonization of empty sediment in trays on and above the substratum confirmed that most reoccupation of denuded areas is by drift. This supports the finding that drift is far geater than random wandering of the insects.

Recent attempts to explain the implementation of conditionality incorporated in IMF-supported programmes have used the concept of ‘ownership’. A literature on ownership has begun to emerge and, alongside this, policy changes in the form of streamlining conditionality and broadening participation in its design have been introduced to encourage ownership. However, ownership is difficult to define precisely and this limits its operational value. This paper focuses instead on implementation and suggests that wider participation will not guarantee better implementation. However, it stresses that political economy variables are important in assessing the chances of implementation and argues that these need to be considered more fully than they are at present when programmes are being negotiated. We suggest a narrow concept of ownership that focuses on prospects for implementation. One implication is that the Fund may have to make concessions on the technical design of programmes in order to maximise the chances that improved policies will be adopted. Comparative Economic Studies (2004) 46, 423–450. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ces.810006