In seeking to understand IMF lending early large sample econometric studies tended to focus on economic factors. Political and institutional influences were often deemed to be reflected in the frequently large residual. At the same time increasing anecdotal evidence was being amassed to suggest that political factors were indeed important. However, more recent studies have claimed that, by using superior estimating techniques, a satisfactory explanation of Fund lending can be provided without needing to include political and institutional factors, which are in any case difficult to measure and model. This study shows that there is large sample evidence supporting the importance of some of these variables, though their contribution to predicting the pattern of IMF agreements is minimal. It goes on to discuss some of the implications of this for the Fund as the world's premier international financial institution. The research upon which this paper is based was supported by the UK Department for International Development (DFID). While this support is gratefully acknowledged, the views and opinions expressed are those of the authors alone. Thanks to Chris Worswick and two anonymous referees for comments, and Connie Tulus and Helgi Maki for research assistance.

It has frequently been assumed that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) plays an important catalysing role in mobilizing international capital for developing countries and countries in transition. The Fund has conventionally been depicted as a "gatekeeper" that unlocks financial flows from other sources, particularly private international capital markets. However, more recently, international financial crises have highlighted the problem of capital volatility and have led to calls for reform of the international financial architecture and, as part of this, the IMF. Unfortunately, basic questions about the interaction between current institutional arrangements and international capital markets have yet to be answered. How do international capital markets react to the activities of the IMF? Do the reactions of private and public lenders differ? Have their reactions changed over time? Do market responses depend on country characteristics and on the type of IMF involvement and, if so, how? This paper addresses these questions and goes on to discuss the policy implications that arise.

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Increasing attention is being paid to political economy dimensions of the IMF's operations. However, up until now, the literature has lacked a systematic overview of how politics and economics interact in this context. This paper sets out to fill the gap. Its conceptual basis is that of the ‘life cycle’ of an IMF programme. What determines the decision to turn to the Fund for financial assistance, what determines the outcome of negotiations, what determines whether a country will come back to the Fund? Answers to these questions cannot be satisfactorily given by examining economics alone. The paper draws on existing evidence to provide an empirically based discussion of the issues involved. It also points the direction in which future research needs to go. Some of the policy implications of the analysis are also examined.

Particularly in the context of the Millennium Development Goals, there has been much discussion of the association between the International Monetary Fund and bilateral aid flows. What role should the Fund be playing in helping to achieve the MDGs? Some observers have suggested that the Fund should seek to reduce its role in poor countries and should be minimising its own lending. They see aid donors taking on a larger role and present the IMF and aid donors as substitutes. Others envisage a much bigger lending role for the Fund. This may hint at complementarities. Although this discussion raises important policy issues there are very few studies that examine the relationship empirically. This paper attempts to help fill this gap. It explores the extent to which the IMF has had a catalytic effect on Official Development Assistance and the potential channels through which catalysis might work. It finds strong evidence of a positive association and suggests that this may have more to do with conditionality than with the provision of IMF resources. But it may not represent catalysis in the conventional sense. There is a synergy between the IMF and bilateral aid that may yet be more fully developed and exploited.

In a 2005 article in this journal, Genberg poses the question of whether countries with IMF programs have “privileged access” to international capital markets. In attempting to answer this question, he cautions about reading too much into some of the recent literature. In this paper, we briefly examine the so-called catalytic effect in a way that attempts to overcome some of his concerns. Our results suggest that it is unwise to place too much emphasis on any set of specific results that may not be generalized or robust across different methodologies and different types of capital flows.capital flows, IMF,

At a time when there is a serious debate about reforming the international financial architecture, it is important to understand how existing multilateral agencies affect financial flows to emerging and less-developed countries. This paper extends past research - which has focused on the International Monetary Fund - by examining the various mechanisms through which the World Bank may be associated with other financial flows, and by presenting new empirical evidence based on regression analysis. Little support is found for a positive connection. The implications of this finding for effective reform of the Bank and its various activities are then discussed.Financial Flows, World Bank, IMF, Capital, Conditionality, Lending, Trade, Mechanisms,

Does one model fit all when it comes to the determinants of IMF programs? Certainly claims have been made by the IMF that capital account crisis (CAC) countries are discernibly different in terms of the characteristics that lead them to borrow from it, while other research has claimed that it is only Asian economies that are different from the rest. This paper sets out to examine these issues. It tests various forms of a fairly conventional model to see whether some forms better fit certain groups of countries than others. It then uses the favoured models to estimate the probability of countries having an IMF arrangement. In particular it examines countries that have been identified by the Fund as CAC countries, but it also looks at a number of comparator countries. The findings suggest that there are some differences between low income and middle income countries. Pressures in the foreign exchange market are significant for the latter but not for the former. The paper also discusses differences between regions and within regions. Broadly speaking the findings confirm that Asian economies around the time of the 1997|1998 crisis tended to turn to the IMF for financial support more quickly than would have been anticipated on the basis of the existing best-fitting models. The paper also discusses the implications of the findings for policy and for the reform of the IMF. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.