2004
DOI: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2003.12.002
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Many happy returns? Recidivism and the IMF

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Cited by 118 publications
(92 citation statements)
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References 21 publications
(15 reference statements)
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“…For a discussion of 'recidivism' in IMF lending see Conway (2007) and Bird et al (2004). 3 While some of these states have used IMF resources they have not used these resources under a conditional lending arrangement.…”
Section: The Imf and The World Bank In Sub-saharan Africamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For a discussion of 'recidivism' in IMF lending see Conway (2007) and Bird et al (2004). 3 While some of these states have used IMF resources they have not used these resources under a conditional lending arrangement.…”
Section: The Imf and The World Bank In Sub-saharan Africamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Conway (1994) showed that past participation is a statistically significant indicator of the current likelihood to adopt a program, while Bird et al (2004) and Joyce (2005) established that recidivism is an important aspect of countries' experience with the IMF. Therefore we estimated a number of specifications using past participation (computed as the number of years, out of the previous 10 years, in which the country participated in a program) as an instrument for current participation in an IMF program, using a standard 2SLS procedure.…”
Section: Tests Of Robustnessmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, what are the factors that lead to IMFsupported programmes? The answer to this question is well known: economic variables, such as the current account balance, inflation, international reserves, debt service, GDP per capita, and so on, together with participation in previous programmes explain reasonably well the approval of an IMFsupported arrangement (Conway, 1994;Knight and Santaella, 1997;Bird et al, 2000). Knight and Santaella (1997) found that policy commitments made by recipient governments matter for the programme approval as well; if the authorities promise stronger adjustment, the Fund is more likely to approve a bigger loan.…”
Section: Imf Programmes and Fiscal Developmentsmentioning
confidence: 99%