The effects of domestic strife on the likelihood of an international conflict are tested empirically. A rareevents logit model with corrections for temporal dependence to assess whether domestic strife is related to the initiation of international conflicts is used to test the validity of the diversionary conflict thesis. Results suggest that decision makers do initiate international conflicts when the state is undergoing domestic strife, although not in a predicted manner. The results indicate that violent domestic strife increases the likelihood of a diversionary conflict, whereas nonviolent strife increases the likelihood of repression. The research also presents evidence that calls into question some of the claims made in previous studies and demonstrates that domestic strife in a target state increases the likelihood of being attacked.Itisgenerallybelievedthatdomesticproblemsthatthreatenthesurvivalofadecision maker can influence the conflict behavior of a state. Although qualitative researchers are convinced of a relationship between domestic strife and international conflict, quantitative analysts have found very little evidence to support such a belief. Using a directed dyad data set that contains a variety of control variables, I evaluate the affect of domestic dissatisfaction on the probability of a decision maker's initiating an international conflict. PREVIOUS RESEARCHDomestic dissatisfaction is believed to affect the likelihood of an international conflict in three ways. First, it is expected to increase the probability of external aggression. Internal difficulties are externalized to divert attention away from domestic problems (Levy 1989). The decision maker believes that an international conflict will generate a "rally round the flag" effect (Mueller 1973). The domestic constituency will

Research on public support for war shows that citizens are responsive to various aspects of strategic context. Less attention has been paid to the core characteristics of the target state. In this comparative study we report survey experiments manipulating two such characteristics, regime type and dominant faith, to test whether the ''democratic peace'' and the ''clash of civilizations'' theses are reflected in U.S. and British public opinion. The basic findings show small differences across the two cases: both publics were somewhat more inclined to use force against dictatorships than against democracies and against Islamic than against Christian countries. Respondent religion played no moderating role in Britain: Christians and nonbelievers were alike readier to attack Islamic states. However, in the United States, the dominant faith effect was driven entirely by Christians. Together, our results imply that public judgments are driven as much by images and identities as by strategic calculations of threat.

This article reports on an audience costs experiment embedded into a survey of the British public (N = 2235). We extend previous research into audience costs in three main directions. First, we provide clear and direct evidence that they exist for a second-order democratic power, the United Kingdom. Second, we show that the extent of audience costs varies, and at times substantially, along with features of the crisis situation that have not been examined empirically in this context before. In particular, the type of crisis strongly influences public reactions both to bluffing in general and to the wisdom or otherwise of escalating crises before backing down. While audience costs do appear to exist for a UK Prime Minister, he or she cannot inflate them by moving up the escalation chain. Rather, a limited use of force tends to mitigate these costs among the British public because it appears to them a more consistent strategy. Third, we show that public disapproval of a failed bluffing strategy is stronger among the more politically engaged, increasing the likelihood that audience costs will be paid at the ballot box.

No abstract

(RES-062-23-1952) as part of a project to investigate 'Foreign policy attitudes and support for war among the British public'. We gratefully acknowledge the support from both funders, and the guidance we received from colleagues in designing the surveys. The research in this article has been presented at the 2012 Annual Convention of the International Studies Association and at seminars at Nuffield College, the University of Essex and the University of Lancaster. In all cases, we thank participants for comments and suggestions. 2At the height of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, civilians risked being the forgotten casualties. They received much less attention from the same American media which give extensive and sympathetic coverage to the deaths, repatriation and funerals of military casualties (Althaus et al., 2014). They were downplayed by the same British leaders who solemnly read out tributes to fallen service personnel in Parliament. And military strategists in both countries favored a doctrine of air strikes which, despite advances in precision munitions, still risks foreign civilian lives in significant numbers in order to minimize the risks to their own troops.In more recent years, however, civilian casualties have begun to receive more attention. This is partly due to the strategic choice mentioned above: with action increasingly taken via unmanned drones, military casualties have become much rarer while civilian death tolls continue to mount. The need to protect civilians has also become central to the case for military action in a context like Syria (e.g. Landay et al., 2015;Wright, 2015), even if the risks to US and British military remain equally central to the case against intervention.Given the earlier imbalance, it is not surprising that civilian casualties were largely overlooked in research -much of it triggered by Iraq and Afghanistan -on the drivers of public support for war. Since military casualties were more conspicuous in public debate, it made sense that they would have a greater influence on citizens' reactions, and in turn that researchers would focus on military casualty aversion. Now that civilian casualties are becoming more prominent in media coverage of conflict, however, a question arises about public reactions. Would we expect reporting of foreign civilian deaths to have a dampening effect on public support for military action? Or did media and academic focus on military casualties reflect the public's own preoccupation with its own servicemen and women over foreign civilians? Answering this question would make both an empirical and a normative contribution. It would improve our understanding of the conditions under which citizens are prepared to support military action. It would also tell us whether support for force is systematically higher than it would be if civilian deaths become a more central presence in elite discussion and media coverage of military action. 3The scant existing evidence makes it hard to assess the strength of public reactions to civilian casualt...

No abstract

Studies of public support for war highlight the importance of context. Most people do not simply support or oppose the use of force but instead assess its merits depending on various aspects of the situation. One such aspect is the extent of international backing – whether from individual states or supranational organizations – for military action. This backing may be active, notably through the contribution of troops, or more a passive matter of endorsement or authorization of action. In this article, a survey experiment embedded in a major internet survey of British foreign policy attitudes (N = 2,205) is used to explore how international backing affects public support for military action. Britain’s military potential and recent history make it an obvious case study here. Both active and endorsement backing prove to have separate and significant positive effects on support. Importantly, the absolute number of troops involved matters far less than the proportion of total troop numbers to be contributed. And the perceived strength of the enemy predicts support only when the British are to contribute a large proportion of total forces. Predispositional variables are used to investigate the sources of the experimental effects but with little success: the impact of international backing proves remarkably consistent across the sample.

The Korean peninsula is one of the most dangerous places on the planet. Decisions relating to the peninsula are for high stakes, and one small error can potentially result in an enormously destructive war. This article seeks to assess whether strategies of engagement or coercion can improve the chances of North Korea co-operating with either the US or South Korea. Using Vector Autoregression (VAR) techniques I assess the behavioural patterns of the North Korean regime in response to the actions of the states involved in the six-party talks between 1990 and 2000. The article finds that there were dramatic differences between the negotiating strategies employed by both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il in their dealings with both the US and South Korea. The results suggest that, in being able to manipulate US foreign policy, the North Koreans are punching well above their weight and that the chances of a meaningful settlement with the regime of Kim Jong Il are very small.