We review the current state of play of in the game of naturalizing content and analyse reasons why each of the main proposals, when taken in isolation, is unsatisfactory. Our diagnosis is that if there is to be progress two fundamental changes are necessary. First, the point of the game needs to be reconceived in terms of explaining the natural origins of content. Second, the pivotal assumption that intentionality is always and everywhere contentful must be abandoned. Reviving and updating Haugeland's baseball analogy in the light of these changes, we propose ways of redirecting the efforts of players on each base of his intentionality All-Star team, enabling them to start functioning effectively as a team. Only then is it likely that they will finally get their innings and maybe, just maybe, even win the game.

The paper presents two empirical cases of expert musicians-a classical string quartet and a solo, free improvisation saxophonist-to analyze the explanatory power and reach of theories in the field of expertise studies and joint action. We argue that neither the positions stressing top-down capacities of prediction, planning or perspective-taking, nor those emphasizing bottom-up embodied processes of entrainment, motor-responses and emotional sharing can do justice to the empirical material. We then turn to hybrid theories in the expertise debate and interactionist accounts of cognition. Attempting to strengthen and extend them, we offer 'Arch': an overarching conception of musical interaction as an externalized, cognitive scaffold that encompasses high and low-level cognition, internal and external processes, as well as the shared normative space including the musical materials in which the musicians perform. In other words, 'Arch' proposes interaction as a multivariate multimodal overarching scaffold necessary to explain not only cases of joint performance, but equally of solo improvisation.

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This paper explicates Wittgenstein's vision of our place in nature and shows in what ways it is unlike and more fruitful than the picture of nature promoted by exclusive scientific naturalists. Wittgenstein's vision of nature is bound up with and supports his signature view that the task of philosophy is distinctively descriptive rather than explanatory. Highlighting what makes Wittgenstein's vision of nature special, it has been claimed that to the extent that he qualifies as a naturalist of any sort he ought to be regarded as a liberal naturalist (Macarthur forthcoming, Wittgenstein, Philosophy of Mind and Naturalism. London: Routledge). We argue, in contrast, that focusing solely on the liberality of Wittgenstein's view of nature risks overlooking and downplaying the ways in which his philosophical clarifications can act as a platform for productively engaging with the sciences in their explanatory endeavors. We argue that Wittgenstein's vision of nature allows for a more relaxed form of naturalism in which philosophy can be a productive partner for scientific inquiry and investigation. Although this feature of Wittgenstein's vision of nature is not something that he himself emphasized, given his interests and concerns, it is an inspiring vision in an age in which philosophy must find its feet with and alongside the sciences.

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In this paper, I address the question of how to account for the normative dimension involved in conceptual competence in a naturalistic framework. First, I present what I call the naturalist challenge (NC), referring to both the phylogenetic and ontogenetic dimensions of conceptual possession and acquisition. I then criticize two models that have been dominant in thinking about conceptual competence, the interpretationist and the causalist models. Both fail to meet NC, by failing to account for the abilities involved in conceptual self-correction. I then offer an alternative account of self-correction that I develop with the help of the interactionist theory of mutual understanding arising from recent developments in phenomenology and developmental psychology.

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Acta Technologica Agriculturae 1/2016Dušan Páleš et al.The most effective way for determination of curves for practical use is to use a set of control points. These control points can be accompanied by other restriction for the curve, for example boundary conditions or conditions for curve continuity (Sederberg, 2012). When a smooth curve runs only through some control points, we refer to curve approximation. The B-spline curve is one of such approximation curves and is addressed in this contribution. A special case of the B-spline curve is the Bézier curve Rédl et al., 2014). The B-spline curve is applied to a set of control points in a space, which were obtained by measurement of real vehicle movement on a slope (Rédl, 2007(Rédl, , 2008. Data were processed into the resulting trajectory (Rédl, 2012;Rédl and Kučera, 2008). Except for this, the movement of the vehicle was simulated using motion equations (Rédl, 2003;Rédl and Kročko, 2007). B-spline basis functionsBézier basis functions known as Bernstein polynomials are used in a formula as a weighting function for parametric representation of the curve (Shene, 2014). B-spline basis functions are applied similarly, although they are more complicated. They have two different properties in comparison with Bézier basis functions and these are: 1) solitary curve is divided by knots, 2) basis functions are not nonzero on the whole area. Every B-spline basis function is nonzero only on several neighbouring subintervals and thereby it is changed only locally, so the change of one control point influences only the near region around it and not the whole curve.These numbers are called knots, the set U is called the knot vector, and the half-opened interval 〈u i , u i + 1 ) is the i-th knot span. Seeing that knots u i may be equal, some knot spans may not exist, thus they are zero. If the knot u i appears p times, hence u i = u i + 1 = ... = u i + p -1 , where p >1, u i is a multiple knot of multiplicity p, written as u i (p). If u i is only a solitary knot, it is also called a simple knot. If the knots are equally spaced, i.e. (u i + 1 -u i ) = constant, for every 0 ≤ i ≤ (m -1), the knot vector or knot sequence is said uniform, otherwise it is non-uniform.Knots can be considered as division points that subdivide the interval 〈u 0 , u m 〉 into knot spans. All B-spline basis functions are supposed to have their domain on 〈u 0 , u m 〉. We will use u 0 = 0 and u m = 1.To define B-spline basis functions, we need one more parameter k, which gives the degree of these basis functions. Recursive formula is defined as follows:This definition is usually referred to as the Cox-de Boor recursion formula. If the degree is zero, i.e. k = 0, these basis functions are all step functions that follows from Eq. (1). N i, 0 (u) = 1 is only in the i-th knot span 〈u i , u i + 1 ). For example, if we have four knots u 0 = 0, u 1 = 1, u 2 = 2 and u 3 = 3, knot spans 0, 1 and 2 are 〈0, 1), 〈1, 2) and 〈2, 3), and the basis functions of degree 0 are N 0, 0 (u) = 1 on interval 〈0, 1) Acta In this co...