Understanding others by doing things together: an enactive account

Satne, Glenda L

doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02692-2

Cited by 15 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…The straightforward view approaches the function of sharing in social cognition in a radically different way (Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009;Campbell, 2011;Satne, 2021;Vincini, 2021). As Campbell (2011) puts it, when an individual is in a joint attentional state with another person, she knows the other's state of attention by means of "introspection. "…”

Section: The Functions Of Shared Mental Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This view affirms that a shared mental state, or experience, is an overarching mental process that involves the distinct contributions of more than one individual. The central ideas of the straightforward view have been advocated by a variety of theorists, including classical and contemporary phenomenologists (Husserl, 1973a;Stein, 2000;Scheler, 2008;Walsh, 2020), contemporary analytic philosophers (Tollefsen, 2002;Campbell, 2011;Gatyas, 2022) and proponents of 4E (Embodied-Enactive-Embedded-Extended) Cognition approaches to the mind (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2008;Hutchins, 2014;Krueger, 2016;Theiner, 2018;Gallagher, 2020;Satne, 2021;Vincini, 2021). 1 There are various strands of empirical research that support the straightforward view, either directly or "indirectly," i.e., by corroborating strictly related theories on phenomena such as imitation, which are intrinsically connected with shared intentionality (Vincini and Gallagher, 2021).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Taking the mystery away from shared intentionality: The straightforward view and its empirical implications

Vincini

2023

Front. Psychol.

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Ordinary language in Western and non-Western cultures individuates shared mental states or experiences as unitary interpersonal events that belong to more than one individual. However, a default assumption in modern Western thought is that, in this regard, ordinary language is either illusory or merely metaphorical: a mental state or experience can belong to only one person. This assumption is called Cartesian eliminativism and is often taken to be foundational in psychology. It follows that any view that contradicts Cartesian eliminativism is a priori suspected of being “mysterious,” i.e., of not meeting scientific standards. This paper suggests that the very opposite may be the case. The straightforward view explains how individuals assemble and experience a shared mental state as a unitary whole whose components are distributed among the participants. The naturalistic advantages of such a view are brought to light by focusing on developmental science. Since it explains early shared emotions, goals, and attention merely by relying on domain-general, associative processes, the straightforward view is more parsimonious than current psychological theories. Indeed, it abandons the cumbersome postulates of (i) multi-level recursive mindreading and (ii) a special, conceptually elusive phenomenal quality. I outline the distinctive developmental predictions of the view and discuss how it accounts for the functions of shared mental states. As a reductionist, non-eliminativist approach, the straightforward view promises to be viable also for cognitive scientists who have so far worked within the Cartesian framework due to a lack of a rigorous and sufficiently developed alternative.

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Section: The Functions Of Shared Mental Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Taking the mystery away from shared intentionality: The straightforward view and its empirical implications

Vincini

2023

Front. Psychol.

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“…Embodied and enactive cognitive science rejects the existence of representations or any form of model-like theorising at any level that is not the level of a fully enculturated agent. More precisely, an agent that has been enculturated with symbols and reasoning skills in a sociocultural setting (Hutto andMyin, 2013, 2017;Durt et al, 2017;Hutto et al, 2020;Satne, 2021). In short, for enactivists, representing requires enculturation and engagement with thinking and inference about a certain state of affairs in the world, i.e., they theorise.…”

Section: What Might Cognition Be If Not Neural Representation?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Cognition Without Neural Representation: Dynamics of a Complex System

Hipólito

2022

Front. Psychol.

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This paper proposes an account of neurocognitive activity without leveraging the notion of neural representation. Neural representation is a concept that results from assuming that the properties of the models used in computational cognitive neuroscience (e.g., information, representation, etc.) must literally exist the system being modelled (e.g., the brain). Computational models are important tools to test a theory about how the collected data (e.g., behavioural or neuroimaging) has been generated. While the usefulness of computational models is unquestionable, it does not follow that neurocognitive activity should literally entail the properties construed in the model (e.g., information, representation). While this is an assumption present in computationalist accounts, it is not held across the board in neuroscience. In the last section, the paper offers a dynamical account of neurocognitive activity with Dynamical Causal Modelling (DCM) that combines dynamical systems theory (DST) mathematical formalisms with the theoretical contextualisation provided by Embodied and Enactive Cognitive Science (EECS).

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“…Thus, it has been suggested that less cognitively demanding cognitive abilities must be operative to explain infant's engagement in shared activities (see ibid). For example, it has been claimed that a sense of “us” can be generated by group identification (Pacherie 2013; Salice and Miyazono 2019), emotional attunement, joint attention, and abilities for bodily coordination (Satne and Salice 2020; Satne 2020). These factors have been claimed to account for children's abilities to share goals with others by bypassing the need to understand the notion of intention and to manipulate mutual representations satisfying recursive clauses for common knowledge (which involve third or four level order intentional states), as required by Bratman's and Tomasello's account of joint action (see Tomasello 2014, 38–39).…”

Section: On the Emergence Of Helping Behavior In Ontogenymentioning

confidence: 99%