The purpose of this article is twofold: to analyze the impact of the information revolution on security and to clarify what existing international relations theory can say about this challenge. These pertinent questions are initially addressed by a critical review of past research. This review shows that the concern for security issues is largely confined to a specialist literature on information warfare and cyber-security, while neither the general literature on information society nor security studies pay any serious attention to information-technology-related security issues. The specialist literature is mostly policy oriented, and only very rarely informed by theory, whether from the international relations discipline or any other field. In this article, three general international relations "schools" (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) are scrutinized with regard to what they can say about security in the digital age. It is argued that the liberal focus on pluralism, interdependence, and globalization, the constructivist emphasis on language, symbols, and images (including "virtuality"), and some elements of realist strategic studies (on information warfare) contribute to an understanding of digital-age security. Finally, it is suggested that pragmatism might help to bridge the gap between theory and practice, and overcome the dualistic, contending nature of international relations theories.Social scientists and experts on technology generally agree that states and societies the world over are becoming, for better or worse, increasingly dependent on information technologies. The development and interconnectedness of information and communications technologies (ICTs) such as the Internet, email, satellite television, and mobile phones are diffusing globally at an impressive speed. The Internet is undoubtedly the most striking example. From only a handful of
In recent years there has been a gradual increase in research literature on the challenges of interconnected, compound, interacting, and cascading risks. These concepts are becoming ever more central to the resilience debate. They aggregate elements of climate change adaptation, critical infrastructure protection and societal resilience in the face of complex, high-impact events. However, despite the potential of these concepts to link together diverse disciplines, scholars and practitioners need to avoid treating them in a superficial or ambiguous manner. Overlapping uses and definitions could generate confusion and lead to the duplication of research effort. The present paper synthesises and reviews the state of the art regarding compound, interconnected, interacting, and cascading risks. It is intended to help build a coherent basis for the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR). The main objective is to propose a holistic framework that highlights the complementarities of the four kinds of complex risk in a manner that is designed to support the work of researchers and policy makers. This paper suggests how compound, interconnected, interacting and cascading risks could be used, with little or no redundancy, as inputs to new analyses and decisional tools designed to support 2 the SFDRR. How could they be used? Abstract lacks description of findings. Too much an introduction, too little a summary.
Corporatisation of critical information infrastructure (CII) is rooted in the 'privatisation wave' of the 1980s-90s, when the ground was laid for outsourcing public utilities. Despite well-known risks relating to reliability, resilience, and accountability, commitment to efficiency imperatives have driven governments to outsource key public services and infrastructures. A recent illustrative case with enormous implications is the 2017 Swedish ICT scandal, where outsourcing of CII caused major security breaches. With the transfer of the Swedish Transport Agency's ICT system to IBM and subcontractors, classified data and protected identities were made accessible to non-vetted foreign private employees -sensitive data could thus now be in anyone's hands. This case clearly demonstrates accountability gaps that can arise in public-private governance of CII.In order to produce, operate and distribute public services and goods to citizens, modern, post-industrial societies rely on complicated logistics systems and intricate asset network architectures. Critical infrastructures can be likened to the arteries and veins of human beings, without which it would be quite impossible for them to function. Essentially, this is why infrastructures such as those for energy, transport, communications and financial services are defined as critical.1 As large and complex systems, catastrophic effects could follow if they were to break down.
2Due to rapid technological development and increasing dependence on information and communications technology (ICT), most of these infrastructures are now operated, managed and/or controlled via interconnected computer networks and information flows, so that they have essentially become critical information infrastructures (CII).3 Elaborating on the body metaphor, this can be seen as the equivalent of adding nerves to the arteries and veins. In the past, destroying or even disrupting physical infrastructures required Dunn-cavelty and Suter, "The art of cIIp Strategy".
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