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Unconventional learning activities such as games and simulations have been widely used as teaching tools in international relations (IR) in the recent years. The literature on simulations and student learning has often highlighted a lack of empirical evidence in the existing research. The paper aims at providing empirical support to illustrate the ways in which simulations might influence students' levels of (factual and self-evaluated) knowledge and perceptions of IR. The study is based on extensive empirical material, collected through questionnaires submitted to 298 students who participated in the 2014 edition of the National Model United Nations in New York (NMUNÁNY). Keywords Simulation Á Model United Nations Á Perceptions Á Knowledge Á IR Despite the growing use of games and simulations as teaching methods in international relations (IR), the existing research has produced a limited number of empirical studies (Giovanello et al. 2013). ''Although many educators realise the potential benefits of games and simulations as pedagogical tools, few researchers have examined their use empirically'' (Garard et al. 1998, p. 42). In addition, the current empirical studies deal more frequently with students' evaluation of the simulation itself rather than with the actual change in the level of knowledge or of perceptions that students experience during the simulation. On the contrary, this paper addresses how and to what extent participating in a simulation affects & Fabrizio Coticchia

Since the end of the bipolar era, the military activism of several Western powers has raised questions about parliamentary control, fostering growing research and analyses on the features, drivers and consequences of the different kinds of oversight exercised by legislative assemblies. Within this scholarly debate, this article focuses on the under-studied case of Italy. How did Italian parties vote on military operations abroad in the post-Cold War era? In order to answer this question, the article presents the first detailed and comprehensive set of data on parliamentary votes over the deployment of the Italian armed forces in the post-Cold War era (i.e. from the beginning of the 1990s to the recent operation against ISIL). Thanks to this extensive new empirical material, the article assesses selected arguments developed by the literature on political parties and foreign policy, paving the way for further research.

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Scholars increasingly suggest that coalition governments produce more extreme foreign policies than single-party governments. Extremity is especially likely when governments include radical parties that take extreme positions on foreign policy issues and are "critical" to the government's survival, as the radical parties push the centrist ones toward the extremes. A look at Italy's Second Republic provides an important counterpoint to the extremity hypothesis. In three high-profile cases of military operations-Albania 1997, Kosovo 1999, and Afghanistan 2006-08-Italy had a center-left government that depended on radical parties for its survival. In all cases, the radical parties opposed military operations but did not prevent the government from acting by forcing the government's fall. Our article seeks to explain the limits of leftist radical parties in Italy's Second Republic. We argue first that radical parties are reluctant to threaten or force government collapse as this can lead to an opposition coalition coming to office and voters' being blamed for the outcome. Second, we claim that foreign policy has been less important to radical parties than domestic issues. Finally, we argue that radical parties have appealed to their voters through theatrical politics and have affected the implementation of military operations. Scholars studying the foreign policies of democracies with coalition governments have increasingly argued in favor of an "extremity hypothesis." In 2008, Juliet Kaarbo and Ryan Beasley first made the case that coalition governments are more likely to adopt extreme foreign policies than single-party governments. One reason why coalition governments are more likely to be extreme is that they are vulnerable to being hijacked by junior parties (Kaarbo and Beasley 2008, 70). The literature further suggests that junior party hijacking that leads to extreme policy

The role of political parties in foreign policy is gaining increasing attention. Nonetheless, despite an extraordinary interest in ‘populism’, the foreign policy of populist parties has rarely been investigated. This article provides an innovative theoretical framework, applying it on a rare example of a ‘pure’ populist party: Italy’s Five Star Movement. How has Five Star Movement positioned on Italian contribution to military operations abroad? What does such positioning say about its ideological leaning? In order to address such questions, the article analyses Five Star Movement’s MPs’ votes and speeches on foreign policy during its first term in Parliament (2013–2018). We find that, notwithstanding some ambiguities, the Movement’s stance has been mostly pacifist and humanitarian, resembling more a ‘left-libertarian populist party’ than a ‘sovereigntist far-right one’. Through these findings, the article contributes to the debate on populist parties and foreign policy in Europe, clarifying also the elusive ideological leaning of the Five Star Movement.

In Italy, the Five Star Movement (M5S) and the Northern League (LN) formed a coalition government after the legislative elections of March 2018. What has been the actual impact of the populist executive in the Italian foreign policy? Relying on the (few) existing analyses that have developed specific hypotheses on the expected international repercussions of populist parties-ruled governments, the paper examines Italy’s foreign policy under the Italian “Yellow–Green” cabinet (June 2018–August 2019). The manuscript advances three hypotheses. First, the foreign policy of the Conte’s government has been featured by a personalistic and a centralized decision-making process. Second, the Yellow-Green executive has adopted a vocal confrontational stance on the world stage, especially within multilateral frameworks, to “take back control” over national sovereignty. Third, such sovereignist foreign policy was largely symbolic because of “strategic” populist attitudes toward public opinion and due to domestic and international constraints. The manuscript—which is based on secondary and primary sources, such as interviews with former ministers, MPs, and diplomats—aims at offering a new perspective on populist parties and foreign policy, alimenting the rising debate on foreign policy change.

The military operation in Libya (2011) is a paradigmatic case regarding the growing interaction of new security challenges: regional instability, transnational organized crime and illegal immigration. The main aim of the paper is to answer the question: Why has Italy employed a specifically military instrument to tackle transnational and non-military threats? Through process tracing the research looks at the political debate over the decisionmaking process in the case of the Italian military engagement in Libya, emphasizing the role played by the strategic culture, international norms and domestic dynamics.