We jointly analyze the static, selection, and dynamic effects of domestic, foreign, and state ownership on bank performance. We argue that it is important to include indicators of all the relevant governance effects in the same model. "Nonrobustness" checks (which purposely exclude some indicators) support this argument. Using data from Argentina in the 1990s, our strongest and most robust results concern state ownership. State-owned banks have poor long-term performance (static effect), those undergoing privatization had particularly poor performance beforehand (selection effect), and these banks dramatically improved following privatization (dynamic effect). However, much of the measured improvement is likely due to placing nonperforming loans into residual entities, leaving "good" privatized banks.

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Developing countries export more to developed, but not other developing countries, when Internet penetration is higher. Although this could be because Internet penetration stimulates exports, it could also be because trade openness encourages Internet use. To test the direction of causation, we allow Internet use to be determined endogenously using countries' regulation of data services as an instrument. The results suggest that access to the Internet does improve export performance in developing countries, although not in developed countries. In other words, improving Internet access in a developing country will stimulate exports from that country to rich countries. (JEL F15)

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