Noting that the literature has focused on the link between the level of public expendi ture and growth, we derive conditions under which a change in the composition of expenditure leads to a higher steady-state growth rate of the economy. The conditions depend not just on the physical productivity of the different components of public expenditure but also on the initial shares. Using data from 43 developing countries over 20 years we show that an increase in the share of current expenditure has positive and statistically significant growth effects. By contrast, the relationship between the capital component of public expenditure and per-capita growth is negative. Thus, seemingly productive expenditures, when used in excess, could become unproductive. These results imply that developing-country governments have been misallocating public expenditures in favor of capital expenditures at the expense of current expenditures.

We use a panel data set of 46 countries over the 1970᎐1989 period to investigate the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth. We find a negative relationship between fiscal decentralization and growth in developing countries, but none in developed countries. Several explanations are offered for our findings.

This paper explores the propositions that, income inequality is relatively stable within countries; and that it varies signi®cantly among countries. A new and expanded data set provides broad support for both propositions. Drawing on a political economy and capital market imperfection arguments to explain the intertemporal and international variation in inequality, the empirical analysis shows that the predicted variables associated with the ®rst argument (a measure of civil liberties and the initial level of secondary schooling) and the second argument (a measure of ®nancial depth and the initial distribution of land) are indeed important determinants of inequality.

This study of China demonstrates how the allocation of fiscal resources between the central and local governments has affected economic growth since reforms began in the late 1970s. We find that a higher degree of fiscal decentralization of government spending is associated with lower provincial economic growth over the past fifteen years. This consistently significant and robust result in our empirical examinations is surprising in light of the argument that fiscal decentralization usually makes a positive contribution to local economic growth.

The paper shows that income inequality may theoretically lead to higher economic growth if public consumption enters the utility function. Empirically, baseline estimations and a sensitivity analysis show that income inequality is positively, and most of the time significantly, associated with economic growth. These findings stand in sharp contrast to the negative association between inequality and growth propounded by Alesina and Rodrik and by Persson and Tabellini.

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Noting that the literature has focused on the link between the level of public expendi ture and growth, we derive conditions under which a change in the composition of expenditure leads to a higher steady-state growth rate of the economy. The conditions depend not just on the physical productivity of the different components of public expenditure but also on the initial shares. Using data from 43 developing countries over 20 years we show that an increase in the share of current expenditure has positive and statistically significant growth effects. By contrast, the relationship between the capital component of public expenditure and per-capita growth is negative. Thus, seemingly productive expenditures, when used in excess, could become unproductive. These results imply that developing-country governments have been misallocating public expenditures in favor of capital expenditures at the expense of current expenditures.

This paper uses an encompassing framework developed by Murphy et al. (1991, 1993) to study corruption and how it affects income distribution and growth. We find that (1) corruption affects income distribution in an inverted U‐shaped way, (2) corruption alone also explains a large proportion of the Gini differential across developing and industrial countries, and (3) after correcting for measurement errors, corruption seems to retard economic growth. But the effect is far less pronounced than the one found in Mauro (1995). Moreover, corruption alone explains little of the continental growth differentials. In countries where the asset distribution is less equal, corruption is associated with a smaller increase in income inequality and a larger drop in growth rates.