Privatization, competition, and corruption: how characteristics of bribe takers and payers affect bribes to utilities

From macro to micro

“…For that reason, these transition countries serve as the great setting for my analysis that both corruption and credit access demonstrate substantial variations on the firm level, which is essential for the identification. This is in accordance with the literature that has shown substantial variation in corruption both cross countries (Djankov et al, 2002) and within countries in this region (Clarke & Xu, 2004;.…”

Dealing with politics for money and power in infrastructure

“…The discussion included the awareness of the fiscal consequences of subsidies and the unwillingness to let regulators work with service providers to end up with financially viable services that could deliver services where they need to be delivered. 24 Goldstein and Estache (2009). 25 There are more efficient schemes based on cash transfers designed in a way that minimize the risk of inclusion/exclusion.…”

“…23 Severe inefficiencies in sector performance can be hidden behind consumption subsidies. 24 If the electorate is sufficiently myopic or ignorant about the subsequent long-term inefficiencies and fiscal cost when voting, the subsidy strategy may increase politicians' chances of getting reelected. Similarly, the elimination of an expensive consumption subsidy scheme, benefiting a large share of consumers might be perceived to be too risky by politicians overly focused on re-election , 25 and thus doomed.…”

State ownership and corruption

“…Focusing on utility companies with a firm-level dataset for 21 transition countries from eastern Europe and Central Asia, Clarke and Xu (2004) find an ambiguous effect of ownership on bribe payments. On the one hand, they find that de novo enterprises are more likely to pay bribes because they have less political power.…”