This article examines how language affects children's inferences about novel social categories. We hypothesized that lexicalization (using a noun label to refer to someone who possesses a certain property) would influence children's inferences about other people. Specifically, we hypothesized that when a property is lexicalized, it is thought to be more stable over time and over contexts. One hundred fifteen children (5- and 7-year-olds) learned about a characteristic of a hypothetical person (e.g., “Rose eats a lot of carrots”). Half the children were told a noun label for each character (e.g., “She is a carrot-eater”), whereas half heard a verbal predicate (e.g., “She eats carrots whenever she can”). The children judged characteristics as significantly more stable over time and over contexts when the characteristics were referred to by a noun than when they were referred to by a verbal predicate. Lexicalization (in the form of a noun) provides important information to children regarding the stability of personal characteristics.

Preschool-age children’s reasoning about the reliability of deceptive sources was investigated. Ninety 3- to 5-year-olds watched several trials in which an informant gave advice about the location of a hidden sticker. Informants were either helpers who were happy to give correct advice, or trickers who were happy to give incorrect advice. Three-year-olds tended to accept all advice from both helpers and trickers. Four-year-olds were more skeptical but showed no preference for advice from helpers over trickers, even though they differentiated between helpers and trickers on metacognitive measures. Five-year-olds systematically preferred advice from helpers. Selective trust was associated with children’s ability to make mental state inferences.

This research used an Implicit Racial Bias Test to investigate implicit racial biases among 3- to 5-year-olds and adult participants in China (N = 213) and Cameroon (N = 257). In both cultures, participants displayed high levels of racial biases that remained stable between 3 and 5 years of age. Unlike adults, young children's implicit racial biases were unaffected by the social status of the other-race groups. Also, unlike adults, young children displayed overt explicit racial biases, and these biases were dissociated from their implicit biases. The results provide strong evidence for the early emergence of implicit racial biases and point to the need to reduce them in early childhood.

Essentialism is the belief that certain characteristics (of individuals or categories) may be relatively stable, unchanging, likely to be present at birth, and biologically based. The current studies examined how different essentialist beliefs interrelate. For example, does thinking that a property is innate imply that the property cannot be changed? Four studies were conducted, examining how children (N=195, grades 1-7; ages 7-13) and adults (N=187) reason about familiar and novel social characteristics. By 3rd grade (9 years), children showed some coherence of essentialist beliefs. In contrast, younger children expected less interrelatedness among dimensions than older children or adults. These findings suggest that essentialist attributions at first consist of separate strands that children eventually link together into a more coherent understanding.

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Motivational helplessness, linked to conceptions of intelligence, has been well documented in older children. While some researchers have reported that children just starting school are motivationally invulnerable, others have found evidence of helplessness when these children encounter failure. The present study seeks to determine whether the reactions associated with helplessness can be identified in a new context, that of criticism, and whether any such responses are related to the child's conceptions of goodness. Subjects were 107 5- and 6-year-old children who enacted achievement situations in which teacher criticism was presented. The 39% of children whose own assessments were undermined by criticism exhibited the affect, task choices, and nonconstructive problem-solving strategies characteristic of helplessness. They were also more likely to make global negative self-judgments following criticism, including negative judgments of their goodness. Finally, these children were more likely to endorse stable and global beliefs about goodness.

This study examined cross-cultural differences and similarities in children's moral understanding of individual-or collective-oriented lies and truths. Seven-, 9-, and 11-year-old Canadian and Chinese children were read stories about story characters facing moral dilemmas about whether to lie or tell the truth to help a group but harm an individual or vice versa. Participants chose to lie or to tell the truth as if they were the character (Experiments 1 and 2) and categorized and evaluated the story characters' truthful and untruthful statements (Experiments 3 and 4). Most children in both cultures labeled lies as lies and truths as truths. The major cultural differences lay in choices and moral evaluations. Chinese children chose lying to help a collective but harm an individual, and they rated it less negatively than lying with opposite consequences. Chinese children rated truth telling to help an individual but harm a group less positively than the alternative. Canadian children did the opposite. These findings suggest that cross-cultural differences in emphasis on groups versus individuals affect children's choices and moral judgments about truth and deception.Keywords cross-cultural; deception; individualism; collectivism; moral development Children around the world are socialized to adhere to the moral and social value systems of their culture and to do what is seen as right and not what is considered wrong. In many cases, the values of a culture are consistent with each other. They promote a coherent set of morally and socially acceptable behaviors. However, it is not unusual that in some situations certain cultural values collide with each other, and in such a circumstance, a moral-social dilemma Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Kang Lee, Institute of Child Study, University of Toronto, 45 Walmer Road, Toronto, Ontario M5R 2X2, Canada, or to Genyue Fu, School of Education, Zhejiang Normal University, Jinhua, Zhejiang, People's Republic of China. E-mail: kang.lee@utoronto.ca or fugy@zjnu.cn. NIH Public Access NIH-PA Author ManuscriptNIH-PA Author Manuscript NIH-PA Author Manuscript might arise. One such dilemma is whether to tell a lie that may help a group or an individual or to speak the truth that might have the opposite effect.The question of what a lie is and whether it is wrong to lie has been a subject of intense debate among Western philosophers and theologians throughout history. There are numerous schools of thought on the issue that generally fall on a continuum. At one extreme, philosophers such as St. Augustine (1952), Kant (1949), andBok (1978) assumed that lying necessarily involves a speaker who knowingly makes a false statement with the intent to deceive. As long as a statement fits this description, it is a lie regardless of the context in which it is uttered. Also, these theorists held a deontological view of the moral implication of lying: Lying is intrinsically wrong and has a constant disvalue regardless of context. Lies must under all but the mo...

The relation between the way in which children interpret human behavior and their beliefs about the stability of human traits is investigated. In interviews with 202 7-and 8-year-olds across 2 studies, the belief that traits are stable predicted a greater tendency to make trait judgments, and an increased focus on outcomes and behaviors through which traits can be judged. In the academic domain, a belief in trait stability was associated with an emphasis on the evaluative meanings of performance outcomes, as opposed to mediating processes such as effort. In the sociomoral domain, the same belief was associated with an emphasis on the evaluative meanings of behaviors (e.g., whether the person is good or bad), as opposed to factors that mediate behavior, such as intention. Results suggest that beliefs about the stability of traits may serve an important role in thinking about and functioning within the academic and sociomoral domains.