Vaidya, and other members of the JP Morgan Chase Institute for their support, contributions, and insights. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.At least one co-author has disclosed a financial relationship of potential relevance for this research. Further information is available online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w27617.ack NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

Due to betrayal aversion, people take risks less willingly when the agent of uncertainty is another person rather than nature. Individuals in six countries (Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States) confronted a binary-choice trust game or a risky decision offering the same payoffs and probabilities. Risk acceptance was calibrated by asking individuals their "minimum acceptable probability" (MAP) for securing the high payoff that would make them willing to accept the risky rather than the sure payoff. People's MAPs are generally higher when another person, rather than nature, determines the outcome. This indicates betrayal aversion. (JEL C72, D81, Z13)

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Women are underrepresented at senior levels in most companies. This article examines whether gender differences in the propensity to negotiate contribute to this pattern. Based on a behavioral experiment run in a major investment bank in the United States, I found that fewer women than men are willing to negotiate, but employees who have a propensity to negotiate are promoted on average seventeen months more quickly than those who do not. Women advance more slowly than men, which accounts for the underrepresentation of women in senior positions. I conclude that gender differences in the propensity to negotiate partially explains why women are on a “slow elevator” to the top.

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This preliminary study explored relationships between women's empowerment and HIV prevention on the national and individual level with a focus on Botswana. Among sub-Saharan Africa countries, HIV prevalence was positively correlated with indirect indicators of women's empowerment relating to their education (female enrollment in secondary education and ratio of female to male secondary school enrollment), but not to their economic status (female share of paid employment in industry and services) or political status (women's share of seats in national parliament), while controlling for gross national income, percentage of births attended, and percentage of roads paved. Condom use at last sexual encounter was positively and significantly correlated with both indicators of women's educational empowerment, but was not significantly related to the other two indices. Empowerment at the individual level was explored through a preliminary quantitative survey of 71 sexually active women in Gaborone, Botswana, that was conducted in February 2001. Regression analyses showed that women's negotiating power and economic independence were the factors most strongly related to condom use, and did not show that education was a crucial factor. Economic independence was the factor most strongly related to negotiating power. These results suggest that in Botswana, HIV prevention efforts may need to improve women's negotiating skills and access to income-generating activities.

"Norms of reciprocity help enforce cooperative agreements in bilateral sequential exchange. We examine the norms that apply in a reciprocal-exchange economy. In our one-shot investment game in a Nairobi slum, people adhered to the norm of "balanced reciprocity," which obligates quid-pro-quo returns for any level of trust. The norm is gendered, with people more likely to comply when confronted with women rather than men, and differs from "conditional reciprocity," prevalent in developed countries, according to which greater trust is rewarded with proportionally larger returns. Balanced reciprocity produces less trust and trustworthiness and smaller gains from trade than conditional reciprocity. "("JEL "C72, C91) Copyright (c) 2008 Western Economic Association International.

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