. 35. A sea-level rise Dsl pushes the entire oceanic lithosphere down; thus, the resulting sea-level rise Dsl is less than the changing mean ocean basement depth Dh, which is computed without this effect. 36. P. L. Heller, C. L. Angevine, Earth Planet. Sci. Lett. 75, 417 (1985). 37. G. C. Bond, Tectonophysics 61, 285 (1979 We document the widespread existence of antisocial punishment, that is, the sanctioning of people who behave prosocially. Our evidence comes from public goods experiments that we conducted in 16 comparable participant pools around the world. However, there is a huge cross-societal variation. Some participant pools punished the high contributors as much as they punished the low contributors, whereas in others people only punished low contributors. In some participant pools, antisocial punishment was strong enough to remove the cooperation-enhancing effect of punishment. We also show that weak norms of civic cooperation and the weakness of the rule of law in a country are significant predictors of antisocial punishment. Our results show that punishment opportunities are socially beneficial only if complemented by strong social norms of cooperation.

Understanding the proximate and ultimate sources of human cooperation is a fundamental issue in all behavioural sciences. In this paper, we review the experimental evidence on how people solve cooperation problems. Existing studies show without doubt that direct and indirect reciprocity are important determinants of successful cooperation. We also discuss the insights from a large literature on the role of peer punishment in sustaining cooperation. The experiments demonstrate that many people are 'strong reciprocators' who are willing to cooperate and punish others even if there are no gains from future cooperation or any other reputational gains. We document this in new one-shot experiments, which we conducted in four cities in Russia and Switzerland. Our cross-cultural approach allows us furthermore to investigate how the cultural background influences strong reciprocity. Our results show that culture has a strong influence on positive and in especially strong negative reciprocity. In particular, we find large cross-cultural differences in 'antisocial punishment' of pro-social cooperators. Further cross-cultural research and experiments involving different sociodemographic groups document that the antisocial punishment is much more widespread than previously assumed. Understanding antisocial punishment is an important task for future research because antisocial punishment is a strong inhibitor of cooperation.

No abstract

We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The theoretical prediction is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are above equilibrium. Second, allowing group members to punish each other leads to even larger conflict expenditures. These results contrast with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency.

Recent reports of the impact of estrogen receptor ␣ and aromatase deficiency have shed new light on the importance of estrogen for bone formation in man. We describe a novel mutation of the CYP19 gene in a 27-yr-old homozygous male of consanguinous parents. A C to A substitution in intron V, at position ؊3 of the splicing acceptor site before exon VI of the CYP19 gene, is the likely cause of loss of aromatase activity. The mRNA of the patient leads to a frameshift and a premature stop codon 8 nucleotides downstream the end of exon V. Both parents were shown to be heterozygous for the same mutation. Apart from genua valga, kyphoscoliosis, and pectus carniatus, the physical examination was normal including secondary male characteristics with normal testicular size. To substitute for the deficiency, the patient was treated with 50 g transdermal estradiol twice weekly for 3 months, followed by 25 g twice weekly. After 6 months estrogen levels (<20 at baseline and 45 pg/ml at 6 months; normal range, 10 -50) and estrone levels (17 and 34 ng/ml; normal range, 30 -85) had normalized. Bone maturation progressed and the initially unfused carpal and phalangeal epiphyses began to close within 3 months and were almost completely closed after 6 months. I N A WIDE VARIETY of tissues, including testis, ovary, placenta, and adipose tissue, the aromatase cytochrome P450, as the product of the CYP19 gene, catalyzes the conversion of androgens to estrogens (1, 2). Reports of osteopenia and osteoporosis in animals and humans with gene defects in the estrogen receptor (3-5) and both in females and males with aromatase deficiency (6 -9) have called attention to the importance of estrogen for skeletal maturation (10). The precise role of estrogen in human male physiology remains largely unknown, especially which effects on bone mineralization and metabolism in the male are mediated by estrogens derived from the aromatization of androgens. Many studies have demonstrated that gonadal failure in males is associated with a decrease in bone mass, but less is known about the role of genetic disorders associated with estrogen resistance or deficiency (11). First descriptions of young men affected by congenital estrogen deficiency have shed new light on the importance of estrogen for bone formation in man (7,8,11,12). These findings suggest that epiphyseal closure does not develop without the action of estrogen even in males and that androgen alone is not sufficient to promote normal skeletal mineralization. Recently two mutations in the CYP19 gene in males have demonstrated the role of estrogen on bone mineralization and their effect on glucose and lipid metabolism (6 -9, 13, 14).We now present the third case of a 27-yr-old man with open epiphysis caused by a new mutation in the CYP19 gene (aromatase deficiency), the effect of estrogen replacement on bone mineralization/maturation and glucose and lipid metabolism. Subjects and Methods Case reportThe propositus was the only child of consanguineous parents (second cousins, Fig. 1). His mother d...

Social comparison processes have potentially far reaching consequences for many economic domains. We conducted a randomized field experiment to examine how social comparison affects workers' effort provision if their own wage or the wage of a co-worker is cut. Workers were assigned to groups of two, performed identical individual tasks, and received the same performanceindependent hourly wage. Cutting both group members' wages caused a decrease in performance. But when only one group member's wage was cut, the affected workers decreased their performance more than twice as much as when both workers' wages were cut. This finding indicates that social comparison processes among workers affect effort provision because the only difference between the two wage-cut treatments is the other group member's wage level. In contrast, workers whose wage was not cut but who witnessed their group member's pay being cut displayed no change in performance relative to the baseline treatment in which both workers' wages remained unchanged. This indicates that social comparison exerts asymmetric effects on effort. Abstract: Social comparison processes have potentially far reaching consequences for many economic domains. We conducted a randomized field experiment to examine how social comparison affects workers' effort provision if their own wage or the wage of a co-worker is cut. Workers were assigned to groups of two, performed identical individual tasks, and received the same performanceindependent hourly wage. Cutting both group members' wages caused a decrease in performance. But when only one group member's wage was cut, the affected workers decreased their performance more than twice as much as when both workers' wages were cut. This finding indicates that social comparison processes among workers affect effort provision because the only difference between the two wage-cut treatments is the other group member's wage level. In contrast, workers whose wage was not cut but who witnessed their group member's pay being cut displayed no change in performance relative to the baseline treatment in which both workers' wages remained unchanged. This indicates that social comparison exerts asymmetric effects on effort. JEL classification:C93, J33, M53

Does the cultural background influence the success with which genetically unrelated individuals cooperate in social dilemma situations? In this paper, we provide an answer by analysing the data of Herrmann et al. (2008a), who studied cooperation and punishment in 16 subject pools from six different world cultures (as classified by Inglehart & Baker (2000)). We use analysis of variance to disentangle the importance of cultural background relative to individual heterogeneity and grouplevel differences in cooperation. We find that culture has a substantial influence on the extent of cooperation, in addition to individual heterogeneity and group-level differences identified by previous research. The significance of this result is that cultural background has a substantial influence on cooperation in otherwise identical environments. This is particularly true in the presence of punishment opportunities.

Due to betrayal aversion, people take risks less willingly when the agent of uncertainty is another person rather than nature. Individuals in six countries (Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States) confronted a binary-choice trust game or a risky decision offering the same payoffs and probabilities. Risk acceptance was calibrated by asking individuals their "minimum acceptable probability" (MAP) for securing the high payoff that would make them willing to accept the risky rather than the sure payoff. People's MAPs are generally higher when another person, rather than nature, determines the outcome. This indicates betrayal aversion. (JEL C72, D81, Z13)