• Este é um artigo publicado em acesso aberto e distribuído sob os termos da Licença de Atribuição Creative Commons, que permite uso irrestrito, distribuição e reprodução em qualquer meio, desde que o autor e a fonte originais sejam creditados.

• Este é um artigo publicado em acesso aberto e distribuído sob os termos da Licença de Atribuição Creative Commons, que permite uso irrestrito, distribuição e reprodução em qualquer meio, desde que o autor e a fonte originais sejam creditados. AbstractThe article discusses the issue of nuclear-propelled submarines as a nuclear non-proliferation question, addresses the issue of safeguards procedures and arrangements, and suggests a broader, political approach to allay international concerns. Such safeguards arrangement would set the precedent for future arrangements, and particularly if integrated into a more comprehensive approach, might strengthen Brazil's hand in nuclear negotiations, including on disarmament.Keywords: Nuclear submarines, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear safeguards, Brazil, International Atomic Energy Agency, Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. Introduction N uclear propulsion for military use, more frequently in submarines, is considered a loophole in the nuclear non-proliferation regime (Ma & Von Hippel, 2001;Moltz 1998;2005;Thielmann and Hoffman 2012); for a different view, see Guimarães 2005). That is is because nuclear propulsion for military craft isa Non-Proscribed Military Activity (NPMA), and the nuclear material used in reactors for that specific purpose is not subject to safeguards. During the negotiations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty -NPT, -it became clear that some prospective members might not join it out of interest in nuclear propulsion for ships and concern about how NPT might impact that. Should safeguards be applied in that case, much of the discretion that is the raison d'être of a submarine in the first place would be compromised or forfeited. But even then, in the late 1960s, it was already considered "a serious loophole in the safeguards prescribed by the Treaty") (Fischer 1997, 272) because during the unsafeguarded periods of its life-cycle, the nuclear material in the reactor could be diverted for the production of nuclear weapons. The risk increases with the degree of enrichment of the nuclear material: if the uranium in the reactor is enriched to around 90% 235 U (usually called weapons-grade uranium 1 ), it could be directly used in nuclear weapons; if it is enriched to around 20% or more 235 U (usually referred to highly-enriched uranium or HEU), it could easily be enriched to weapon-grade uranium. Uranium enriched to less than 20% 235 U is usually called low-enriched uranium or LEU and, at a level below 10% 235 U, it becomes more difficult to substantially enrich to weapons-grade uranium 2 or close to it (Barroso 2009;Bernstein 2008;Bodansky 2004;Heriot 1988;Murray 2001) 3 . Uranium for land-based nuclear reactors is usually enriched to around 3.5%-5% 235 U. Therefore, from a nuclear nonproliferation standpoint, risks would be minimized if naval nuclear reactors had LEU, and particularly less than 10% 235 U content, as its nuclear fissile material. Eugenio Pacelli Lazzarotti Diniz CostaAs a practical matter, this w...

This article proposes a methodology that enables one who has actual cost figures to perform the calculations for benefit-to-cost, strictly from the tactical and logistical standpoints, on the performance equivalence not of nuclear vs. air-independent-propulsion (AIP) submarines, but of nuclear v. AIP submarine fleets. With that in hand, it becomes possible for whomever might have sounder figures than what we could find about the complete life-cycle cost of either alternative to figure out, given our results about the benefit assessment, what would be the result of a benefit-to- cost analysis. We didn't perform the latter, due to uncertainty about the methodology by which the public available cost estimates were calculated. By providing a method for benefit calculation of the military worth of alternatives to support an assessment of the SSN/SSP fleet alternatives, we hope to have provided a sounder point of departure for debate, both in general terms, a method, and for the Brazilian case in particular, an application.

Liberal-Institutionalism and Structural Realism expectations about international organizations are confronted by looking at if and how US-controlled international aid is granted, and particularly if it is related or not to political affinity and to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) non-permanent membership. A preliminary assessment suggests that these relations only hold for the period of the Cold War, and, even then, only when UNSC non-permanent membership is in years in which the Security Council was deemed very important.

Este artigo apresenta e discute o trajeto que levou os desenhos organizacionais das divisões pesadas da URSS e dos EUA ao início e ao final da Guerra Fria. Para tanto, explica as armas combinadas modernas centradas no tanque e o papel central do escalão de comando divisão (10.000-20.000 combatentes) para a disponibilização dos diferentes tipos de tropas necessários para que se possa tê-las quando necessário. Apresenta então os corpos de tanques e mecanizados da URSS, e a divisão blindada dos EUA em 1945, delineando como se chegou às divisões de rifles motorizados e de tanques da URSS e às divisões blindadas e mecanizadas dos EUA tomando c. 1985 como proxy para 1991 em função da turbulência do final da Guerra Fria. A conclusão afirma a continuidade e prevalência do enquadramento de disponibilização de armas combinadas modernas centradas no tanque na divisão como consideração principal no desenho organizacional de forças terrestres até o presente.