Brazil’s Nuclear Submarine: A Broader Approach to the Safeguards Issue

Abstract

• Este é um artigo publicado em acesso aberto e distribuído sob os termos da Licença de Atribuição Creative Commons, que permite uso irrestrito, distribuição e reprodução em qualquer meio, desde que o autor e a fonte originais sejam creditados. AbstractThe article discusses the issue of nuclear-propelled submarines as a nuclear non-proliferation question, addresses the issue of safeguards procedures and arrangements, and suggests a broader, political approach to allay international concerns. Such safeguards arrangement would set the precedent for future arrangements, and particularly if integrated into a more comprehensive approach, might strengthen Brazil's hand in nuclear negotiations, including on disarmament.Keywords: Nuclear submarines, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear safeguards, Brazil, International Atomic Energy Agency, Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. Introduction N uclear propulsion for military use, more frequently in submarines, is considered a loophole in the nuclear non-proliferation regime (Ma & Von Hippel, 2001;Moltz 1998;2005;Thielmann and Hoffman 2012); for a different view, see Guimarães 2005). That is is because nuclear propulsion for military craft isa Non-Proscribed Military Activity (NPMA), and the nuclear material used in reactors for that specific purpose is not subject to safeguards. During the negotiations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty -NPT, -it became clear that some prospective members might not join it out of interest in nuclear propulsion for ships and concern about how NPT might impact that. Should safeguards be applied in that case, much of the discretion that is the raison d'être of a submarine in the first place would be compromised or forfeited. But even then, in the late 1960s, it was already considered "a serious loophole in the safeguards prescribed by the Treaty") (Fischer 1997, 272) because during the unsafeguarded periods of its life-cycle, the nuclear material in the reactor could be diverted for the production of nuclear weapons. The risk increases with the degree of enrichment of the nuclear material: if the uranium in the reactor is enriched to around 90% 235 U (usually called weapons-grade uranium 1 ), it could be directly used in nuclear weapons; if it is enriched to around 20% or more 235 U (usually referred to highly-enriched uranium or HEU), it could easily be enriched to weapon-grade uranium. Uranium enriched to less than 20% 235 U is usually called low-enriched uranium or LEU and, at a level below 10% 235 U, it becomes more difficult to substantially enrich to weapons-grade uranium 2 or close to it (Barroso 2009;Bernstein 2008;Bodansky 2004;Heriot 1988;Murray 2001) 3 . Uranium for land-based nuclear reactors is usually enriched to around 3.5%-5% 235 U. Therefore, from a nuclear nonproliferation standpoint, risks would be minimized if naval nuclear reactors had LEU, and particularly less than 10% 235 U content, as its nuclear fissile material. Eugenio Pacelli Lazzarotti Diniz CostaAs a practical matter, this w...

AUKUS, o submarino de propulsão nuclear brasileiro e as implicações para o regime de não proliferação nuclear

“…This level of uranium enrichment to be used in Australia's submarines has become a source of concern to many observers, as it might weaken the IAEA safeguards system. Meanwhile, in the Brazilian case, due to technical obstacles and economic disadvantages that can be very difficult to overcome, some authorities, while reaffirming the commitment to LEU fuel, have suggested the possibility that it will be closer to the 20% threshold of U-235 (Costa 2017;Spektor 2017). Hence, Costa (2017, p. 8-10) suggests that, albeit not certain from a technical point of view, the degree of uranium enrichment which will be used in the nuclear material for the reactor fuel should be clearly disclosed, as this would help alleviate concerns and avoid unpleasant surprises.…”

“…Therefore, Brazil and Australia would be the first non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) to maintain nuclear-powered submarines without nuclear strike capabilities. In the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard system, there exists what many academics have called a "loophole" (Cormier 2022;Costa 2017;Kaplow 2017;Von Hippel 2019 ;Moltz 1998;2005;2006) 3 or "grey area" (Desjardins;Rauf 1988) that allow NNWS to remove fissile material from the safeguards regime and use it in non-weapon and non-explosive related military applications like fuelling nuclear submarine reactors. Hence, acquiring or developing nuclear-powered submarines is not necessarily illegal, but as Marianne Hanson (2023) has pointed out it "undermines the spirit of the NPT" (verbal information).…”

“…For more information on proposals to deal with the NPT loophole, see: Egel; Goldblum; Suzuki 2015;Kaplow 2017;Shea 2017;Reddie;Goldblum 2018;Philippe 2014;Costa 2017. …”

Cerium ruthenium low-energy antineutrino measurements for safeguarding military naval reactors

“…However, regardless of if HEU or LEU is in use in naval reactors, safeguards need to be considered. Usually the need for keeping military secrets is cited to counter this possibility, however, some studies [1,8,9] make the case that the need for secrecy does not preclude meaningful safeguards, if managed access to the reactor is available. Here, we will consider the case of no access to the reactor (or even access on-board the submarine), which goes beyond what has been considered in the literature so far.…”