Federal prosecutors have immense power and discretion to decide when to bring criminal charges, what plea bargains to offer, and how to implement the federal government’s legal priorities in their districts. While U.S. Attorneys take pains to emphasize their independence, we know relatively little about the extent to which politics colors federal prosecutorial staffing and decision-making. The Politics of Federal Prosecution draws upon a wealth of data from 1990s to the present to examine the interplay of political factors and federal prosecution. First, the authors find that congressional and presidential politics affect who becomes federal prosecutors and how long those individuals serve. Second, the book demonstrates that signals of presidential and congressional preferences, along with local priorities, affect key prosecutorial decisions: whether to bring prosecutions, how to approach plea bargaining negotiations, and when to utilize criminal asset forfeiture to cripple criminal activities. In short, the book demonstrates that politics affects the behavior of U.S. Attorneys at nearly every stage of their service.

Is a federal prosecutor’s decision whether to pursue violent crime charges political? While prosecutors frequently assert their decision-making independence, their selection and operational constraints suggest a very different story. We assess whether political factors related to the prosecution priorities of the president, Congress, and the local public affect federal prosecutors’ decisions to pursue or decline charges in violent crime matters. To empirically examine this, we utilize data from 89 U.S. Attorneys offices from 1996 to 2011. The results provide rich new insight into when and why federal prosecutors’ decisions to pursue or decline prosecutions are driven by the preferences of the president, Congress, and the local public. The findings also have important broader implications for the role of political factors in a U.S. criminal justice system believed by many to be in crisis.

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This chapter examines U.S. Attorneys’ decisions regarding charging and bargaining with federal criminal defendants. Based on our theoretical expectations about the importance of political responsiveness in prosecutorial decisions, we expect that prosecutors will be less likely to demonstrate leniency in providing charge reductions and offering substantial assistance downward sentencing departures when their political principals and local public send strong signals regarding their prosecutorial priorities for a given area of crime. We test this expectation empirically, relying on DOJ and U.S. Sentencing Commission data on federal violent crimes. We find evidence that political responsiveness helps drive prosecutorial behavior for both charge reductions and substantial assistance departures.

The state courts of last resort are vital components of American judicial system, disposing of many important legal matters. The chief justices of these courts serve consequential roles in these institutions. Although scholars have examined the selection and duties of states’ chief justices, their interactions with the elected branches are understudied. We focus on how chief justices on state high courts use their roles to encourage judicial reform. Specifically, we examine the determinants of chief justices’ successes or failures as advocates for their justice systems. To analyze why chief justices succeed or fail as reform advocates, we analyze the fate of reform proposals offered in state of the judiciary addresses. Our results indicate that greater ideological similarity between the state legislature and chief justice or state supreme court median increases the odds of an agenda item being enacted. We also find that the scope of a policy request influences the likelihood it will be granted.

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What function do federal prosecutors play in the modern political system, and how has this role changed over time? In this chapter, we explore the historical evolution of federal prosecutors and the DOJ (and its predecessors) and review the organization of the modern DOJ. We provide evidence that politics and the administration of federal justice have always been tightly intertwined. Moreover, the enlargement of federal law since the Civil War has brought with it the an increase in the size of the federal prosecutorial machine, the DOJ, and the role of the U.S. Attorney General. Using data from the DOJ, we illustrate the growth of the federal prosecutorial machine and discuss its ramifications for the role of the U.S. Attorney in the modern political system.

This article examines the common assertion that the Republican Party “owns” the issue of crime, which holds that the party has garnered electoral support when crime is a salient political issue. Competing explanations about the origins of the American public’s crime concern are tested in an electoral context. Utilizing data on races for the U.S. House of Representatives and races for the U.S. Senate held from 1974 to 2008, the analyses show that increased salience of crime has provided electoral benefits for Republican candidates. Furthermore, they show that Republicans have increased these gains by responsively catering their message to the issue at times of peak concern. Altogether, the results provide support for Republican issue ownership of crime.