The Politics of Federal Prosecution

Abstract

Federal prosecutors have immense power and discretion to decide when to bring criminal charges, what plea bargains to offer, and how to implement the federal government’s legal priorities in their districts. While U.S. Attorneys take pains to emphasize their independence, we know relatively little about the extent to which politics colors federal prosecutorial staffing and decision-making. The Politics of Federal Prosecution draws upon a wealth of data from 1990s to the present to examine the interplay of political factors and federal prosecution. First, the authors find that congressional and presidential politics affect who becomes federal prosecutors and how long those individuals serve. Second, the book demonstrates that signals of presidential and congressional preferences, along with local priorities, affect key prosecutorial decisions: whether to bring prosecutions, how to approach plea bargaining negotiations, and when to utilize criminal asset forfeiture to cripple criminal activities. In short, the book demonstrates that politics affects the behavior of U.S. Attorneys at nearly every stage of their service.

Serving the Law or Playing Politics? The Strategic Use of U.S. Attorney Appointments

“…The full data set extends from 1970 to September 2021. However, for the purposes of this article we are restricting analysis to the years studied by Boyd et al (2021) as the extended analysis of Nelson and Ostrander (2016). In doing so, we demonstrate how this theory and findings builds around existing knowledge.…”

“…Attorneys have the power and opportunity to impact both the lives of individual defendants and the overall quality of justice in the American legal system (Lochner 2002). As we discussed, common among existing research on the politics of USA confirmation (Boyd et al 2021;Nelson and Ostrander 2016) is valuable insight into the incentives for delaying confirmation given the reversion point of a district court-appointed interim USA. However, scholars have not yet integrated the full set of interim USA appointees into their studies of U.S.…”

“…U.S. Attorney positions in districts with two home-state senators from the president's party face the least costly nominations as they are shepherded through selection and 7. Boyd et al (2021) also explicitly examine the politics of U.S. Attorney appointments, however, their analysis extends the analysis presented in Nelson and Ostrander (2016) from 2010 to 2016 and demonstrates that their original findings on Senate delay hold. 8.…”

The Attorney General’s Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in Malaysia: A Critique of Scope, Limitation and Challenges

“…Despite the commitment to independence, the prosecutors (and in the context of this paper, the Attorney General) are at times, consider political factors in deciding to prosecute. This unfortunately can undermine the confidence and trust of the public in the government of the day (Boyd et al, 2021). VC George J explained the position of the Attorney General in Malaysia in Lim Kit Siang v United Engineers (M) Bhd & 3 Ors [1988] 1 MLJ 50 that, In Malaysia, the Attorney-General's position is very different from that of his British counterpart.…”

Where Have the Guardians Gone? Law Enforcement and the Politics of Supranational Forbearance in the European Union

“…Holland notes that when law enforcement institutions are not well-insulated from political influence, policymakers may restrain them to bolster their support with a group of voters for whom enforcement is unpopular. In domestic political contexts, forbearance typically involves a public or partisan electoral exchange: Policymakers refrain from enforcing the law in ways that visibly benefit members of their targeted electoral constituency (Feierherd 2020;Dewey & Di Carlo 2021;Harding et al 2021;Boyd et al 2021). This domestic electoral logic, however, does not translate seamlessly to the supranational level, where the actors, motives, and scope of forbearance politics differ.…”