This paper studies the efficiency impacts of private toll roads in initially untolled networks. The analysis allows for capacity and toll choice by private operators, and endogenises entry and therewith the degree of competition, distinguishing and allowing for both parallel and serial competition. Two institutional arrangements are considered, namely one in which entry is free and one in which it is allowed only after winning an auction in which patronage is to be maximised. Both regimes have the second-best zero-profit equilibrium as the end-state of the equilibrium sequence of investments; but the auctions regime approaches this end-state more rapidly: tolls are set equal to their second-best zero-profit levels immediately, and capacity additions for the earlier investments are bigger. When discreteness of capacity is relevant and limits the number of investments that can be accommodated practically, the auctions regime may therefore still result in a more efficient end-state, with a higher social surplus, although the theoretical end-state is the same as under free entry.
ABSTRACT. This paper explores interrelations between pricing, capacity choice, and financing in transportation networks. We build on the Mohring-Harwitz result on self-financing of optimally designed and priced roads and investigate it in a network environment under various types of second-best regulation. A small network model with endogenous car ownership demonstrates that optimal congestion pricing and capacity choice over an entire network may cause user prices to increase more in initially mildly congested areas compared to heavily congested areas. Furthermore, a flat kilometer charge under optimal capacity choice may result in first-best efficiency gains.
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