We have established new values of time (VOTs) and values of travel time reliability (VORs) for use in cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of transport projects in The Netherlands. This was the first national study in The Netherlands (and one of the first world-wide) to investigate these topics empirically in a joint framework.Stated preference (SP) questionnaires were designed for interviewing travellers, where the hypothetical alternatives were described in terms of travel time, travel costs and travel time reliability, the latter being presented to the respondents in the form of five possible travel times having equal probability.For passenger transport, we first collected interviews using an existing internet panel. Additional data collection recruitment was done by asking travellers at petrol stations/service areas, parking garages, stations, bus stops, airports and ports to participate in the survey. One important conclusion is that the SP survey using members of this internet panel leads to substantially lower VOTs than the SP survey with en-route recruitment, probably because of self-selection bias in the internet panel.We estimated discrete choice models in which the values of time differ between trips with different time and costs levels, different time and costs changes offered in the SP, and different observed characteristics of the respondents (e.g. education, income, age, household composition). By using a panel latent class model, we also account for unobserved differences between respondents in the value of time and for repeated measurements/panel effects. The reference values of time and the reference reliability ratios were estimated on the 2011 sample only, but the effect of time and cost level, time and cost changes offered and socio-economic attributes was estimated on both the 2009 and 2011 samples.

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This paper investigates the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in the Vickrey bottleneck model when each user controls a positive fraction of total traffic. Users simultaneously choose departure schedules for their vehicle fleets. Each user internalizes the congestion cost that each of its vehicles imposes on other vehicles in its fleet. We establish three results. First, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) may not exist. Second, if a PSNE does exist, identical users may incur appreciably different equilibrium costs. Finally, a multiplicity of PSNE can exist in which no queuing occurs but departures begin earlier or later than in the system optimum. The order in which users depart can be suboptimal as well. Nevertheless, by internalizing self-imposed congestion costs individual users can realize much, and possibly all, of the potential cost savings from either centralized traffic control or time-varying congestion tolls

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThis paper studies whether a regulator needs to correct the route structure choice by carriers with market power in the presence of congestion externalities, in addition to correct their pricing. We account for passenger benefits from increased frequency, passenger connecting costs, airline endogenous hub location and route structure strategic competition.We find that, for some parameters, an instrument directly aimed at regulating route structure choice may be needed to maximize welfare, in addition to per-passenger and per-flight tolls designed to correct output inefficiencies. This holds true when the regulator is constrained to set non-negative tolls, but also for the case of unconstrained tolling.

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