No abstract

Theory predicts that capping brokers' compensation exacerbates the exploitation of retail investors. We show that regulated caps on mutual fund 12b-1 fees, effectively sales commissions, are associated with negative equity fund performance, but only after a structural shift toward maximum permitted levels of the fees around 2000. Past this break point, flow-performance sensitivity shifts from the middle-to the highest-performing funds, suggesting that the fee cap increases performance-chasing behavior by constraining brokers' incentives to learn about lower-ranked funds. The policy implication is that regulators must reevaluate the efficacy of caps on brokerage fees.

This paper examines the impact of political connections (i.e., lobbying and political contributions) on the time it takes to detect corporate misconduct and the size of penalties following securities class actions (SCAs), restatements and Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs).We find firms with political connections exhibit longer misconduct periods for SCAs, and such ability to conceal misconduct for longer translates into a larger settlement size.In addition, we find politically connected firms are associated with greater shareholder losses and are less likely to be involved in Securities Exchange Commission enforcement actions on restatements. Finally, while we do not find any relation between political connections and the likelihood of AAERs being settled, we find political connections are associated with lower AAER settlement size.

No abstract

We study the effect of the educational diversity of managers on the performance of team‐managed mutual funds using a large sample of U.S. equity funds from 1994 to 2013. We consider diversity in terms of both final educational degree and field of educational specialisation. We find that, in general, both types of diversity have a positive impact on fund performance, and our results are robust over a wide range of performance metrics and changes in market conditions.