2022
DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12603
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Political connections, tacit power and corporate misconduct

Abstract: This paper examines the impact of political connections (i.e., lobbying and political contributions) on the time it takes to detect corporate misconduct and the size of penalties following securities class actions (SCAs), restatements and Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs).We find firms with political connections exhibit longer misconduct periods for SCAs, and such ability to conceal misconduct for longer translates into a larger settlement size.In addition, we find politically connected firm… Show more

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Cited by 13 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…With respect to unintentional actions, the opaque information environment of politically connected firms may also be explained by the fact that the preferential government treatment of such firms weakens their regulatory and capital market incentives to produce high quality reports. Consistent with this interpretation, several studies report that connected firms face lower enforcement costs in that they are less likely to receive Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases and are also subject to lower penalties if prosecuted (McCarten et al., 2022; Mehta & Zhao, 2020; Correia, 2014; Yu & Yu, 2011). Also, Chaney et al.…”
Section: Related Literature and Hypotheses Developmentmentioning
confidence: 94%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…With respect to unintentional actions, the opaque information environment of politically connected firms may also be explained by the fact that the preferential government treatment of such firms weakens their regulatory and capital market incentives to produce high quality reports. Consistent with this interpretation, several studies report that connected firms face lower enforcement costs in that they are less likely to receive Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases and are also subject to lower penalties if prosecuted (McCarten et al., 2022; Mehta & Zhao, 2020; Correia, 2014; Yu & Yu, 2011). Also, Chaney et al.…”
Section: Related Literature and Hypotheses Developmentmentioning
confidence: 94%
“…Releases and are also subject to lower penalties if prosecuted (McCarten et al, 2022;Mehta & Zhao, 2020;Correia, 2014;Yu & Yu, 2011). Also, Chaney et al (2011) show that CPA firms have less informative accounting reports than their peers; yet they are subject to relatively less severe penalties from capital market participants for poor earning quality.…”
Section: Why Corporate Political Activities Shape Accounting Practices?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Political connections can provide firms with legal advantages and offer protection against litigation risk for managers and directors (Jia et al, 2019). This soft power held by politically connected firms discourages agents from exposing corporate misconduct, allowing these firms to evade detection for longer periods (McCarten et al, 2022). Politically connected companies may prioritize their own interests over public concerns (Faccio, 2006(Faccio, , 2010, resulting in reduced commitment to disclosing high-quality accounting information.…”
Section: Mf 501mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…, 2019). This soft power held by politically connected firms discourages agents from exposing corporate misconduct, allowing these firms to evade detection for longer periods (McCarten et al. , 2022).…”
Section: Institutional Background and Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Brown and Huang (2020) find that firms that spend more on political lobbying are more likely to have greater access to federal officials capable of providing regulatory relief to firms. Although the existing literature often uses campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures to measure political spending or activity (McCarten et al., 2022; Unsal et al., 2016), we concentrate on only political lobbying expenditures as a more directly observable measurement of political spending. Lobbying expenditure is more targeted because it can influence legislation, government agencies and departments, such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA; Hersch et al., 2008).…”
Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%