Transparency in the extractives sector is widely seen as an important tool for improving accountability and deterring corruption. Yet for those very reasons, it is a puzzle that so many governments in corruption‐prone countries have voluntarily signed up to greater scrutiny in this area by joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). We argue that EITI serves as a reputational intermediary, whereby reformers can signal good intentions and international actors can reward achievement. International and domestic actors thus utilize EITI to diffuse the norm of resource transparency and to advance reformist aims in a highly problematic policy area.

Incoming governments sometimes abuse their power to manipulate the allocation of government contracts so as to buy loyalty from cronies. While scandals suggest such practices are relatively widespread, the extent of such partisan favoritism is difficult to measure and the conditions under which it flourishes under-theorized. Drawing on theory regarding the role of institutions as constraints on corruption, we identify three spheres of political influence over government contracting and show how elites can manipulate two of those spheres to increase their opportunities to influence the procurement process and minimize external accountability, facilitating the corrupt allocation of contracts to partisan allies. Using an innovative big data methodology, we then identify the effects of a change in government on procurement markets in two countries, Hungary and the United Kingdom, which differ in terms of political influence over these institutions. We find that politically-favored companies secure 50-60% of the central government contracting market in Hungary but only 10% in the UK.

No abstract

We investigate why top-down directives aimed at eradicating corruption are ineffective at altering on-the-ground practices for organizations that have adopted industry-wide "gold standards" to prevent bribery and corruption. Using interview and focus group data collected from leading multinational pharmaceutical firms, we unearth antecedents contributing to organizations' systemic failure to embed their anticorruption policies in business practice.We identify two tensions that contribute to this disconnect: a culture clash between global and local norms, especially in emerging markets and a similar disconnect between the compliance and commercial functions. To overcome these tensions, we suggest that organizations are likely to find it easier to implement a no gifts policy if they cease to rely on local agents embedded in local norms and that there needs to be strong evidence of boardlevel commitment to antibribery programs, innovative ways of incentivizing compliant behavior, and a fundamental rethinking of organizations' business model and remuneration practices.

This article explores how realism in political theory can inform our understanding of political corruption. Whereas political moralists see corruption as a problem of implementation, which does not undermine their values, realists see corruption as posing a more fundamental problem, challenging the very nature of politics and undermining the attempt to establish and exercise authority in the ordering of conflict and the allocation of resources. Recent realist work has sought to characterize a discrete type of "institutional" corruption, and to construct political corruption as the antithesis of good governance or impartiality. Other work has focused on the micro level, drawing on new insights from psychology and experimental economics to analyze individual decisions and motivations to behave corruptly. This article challenges scholars to build future research upon a richer understanding of the realities of political life that are intrinsic to both individual and institutional patterns of corruption.