Does economic coercion increase or decrease government respect for human rights in countries targeted with economic sanctions? If economic sanctions weaken the target regime's coercive capacity, human rights violations by the government should be less likely. If, on the contrary, sanctions fail to attenuate the coercive capacity of the target elites and create more economic difficulties and political violence among ordinary citizens, the government will likely commit more human rights violations. Focusing on competing views of why sanctions might improve or deteriorate human rights conditions, this article offers an empirical examination of the effect sanctions have on the physical integrity rights of citizens in target countries. Utilizing time-series, cross-national data for the period 1981—2000, the findings suggest that economic sanctions worsen government respect for physical integrity rights, including freedom from disappearances, extra-judicial killings, torture, and political imprisonment. The results also show that extensive sanctions are more detrimental to human rights than partial/selective sanctions. Economic coercion remains a counterproductive policy tool, even when sanctions are specifically imposed with the goal of improving human rights. Finally, multilateral sanctions have a greater overall negative impact on human rights than unilateral sanctions.
This study examines whether the state's ability to provide social welfare services has any major effect on the probability of civil conflict onset. We argue that welfare spending contributes to sustaining peace because the provision of social services reduces grievances by offsetting the effects of poverty and inequality in society. Welfare spending serves as an indication of the commitment of the government to social services and reflects its priorities and dedication to citizens. By enacting welfare policies that improve the living standards of citizens, governments can co-opt the political opposition and decrease the incentives for organizing a rebellion. Utilizing time-series, cross-national data for the 1975-2005 period, the results indicate that as the level of the government investment in welfare policies (i.e. education, health, and social security) increases, the likelihood of civil conflict onset declines significantly, controlling for several other covariates of internal conflict. Additional data analysis shows that general public spending and military expenditures are unlikely to increase or decrease the probability of civil unrest. Overall, these findings suggest that certain types of public spending, such as welfare spending, might have a strong pacifying effect on civil conflict, and therefore the state's welfare efforts are vital for the maintenance of peace.
Despite the abundance of country-specific evidence and policy debate on the humanitarian effects of sanctions, there has not been any crossnational empirical research that examines the human cost of sanctions. In this study, I offer a quantitative analysis of the effect that economic sanctions have on public health conditions in target countries. I use the child mortality rate among under five-year olds as a proxy for health status and utilize time-series cross-nation data for the 1970-2000 period. According to the results, the public health effect of sanctions is largely conditional on the extent to which economic coercion is costly on the target economy. The United States as a sender is also likely to increase the negative impact of sanctions on public health conditions. The economic wealth of target countries is unlikely to play any significant interactive role in mitigating the effect of economic coercion on public health. Similarly, the involvement of an intergovernmental organization (IGO) in sanction imposition has no discernable impact on child mortality.
What effect do International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank programs have on collective labor rights? Labor rights advocacy networks and organized labor groups have long been critical of neoliberal policy prescriptions attached to loans by international financial institutions (IFIs), claiming that they harm the interests of workers. IFIs dispute these claims, noting that they work with relevant labor organizations and that many of their arrangements call for compliance with core labor standards. Yet very little research has been devoted to whether IFI programs affect labor laws and the actual labor practices of recipient countries. We argue that IFI programs undermine collective labor rights. Specifically, recommended policy reforms, as well as the broader signals connoted by participation in the programs, undermine labor organizations and the adoption of protective laws. To substantiate these claims, we use time-series cross-national data for a sample of 123 low- and middle-income countries for the years 1985 to 2002. Our findings suggest that programs from both IFIs are negatively and significantly related to labor rights, including laws designed to guarantee basic collective labor rights as well as the protection of these rights in practice.
Though it is widely accepted that advancing women’s rights is crucial to promoting more economic prosperity, good governance, and social equality, very few studies have analyzed the gender-specific effects of foreign policy tools. In this study, we focus on the impact that a frequently used coercive tool — international economic sanctions — has on women’s well-being. Sanctions can have a devastating impact on both the target country’s economic and political stability, and women often suffer significantly from the effects of such external shocks due to their vulnerable socioeconomic and political status. We thus argue that foreign economic pressures will reduce the level of respect for women’s rights in the targeted countries. We use four different measures of women’s economic, political, and social status to analyze the gender-specific consequences of economic coercion. Results from the analysis for the period 1971–2005 indicate that sanctions are likely to exacerbate women’s rights. The data analysis also shows that the suggested negative impact of economic coercion on women’s well-being is conditioned by the wealth of a targeted country; women in poor countries are hit the hardest by economic sanctions.
Do transnational human rights organizations (HROs) influence foreign military intervention onset? We argue that the greater international exposure of human suffering through HRO "naming and shaming" activities starts a process of mobilization and opinion change in the international community that ultimately increases the likelihood of humanitarian military intervention. We test the empirical implication of the argument on a sample of all non-Western countries from 1990 to 2005. The results suggest that HRO shaming makes humanitarian intervention more likely even after controlling for several other covariates of intervention decisions. Further, the suggested effect of HROs holds when we use just the general count of all shaming reports by HROs in the popular press or weigh this count by the intensity of the negative shaming message. Finally, HRO activities appear to have a significant impact on the likelihood of military missions by IGOs as well as interventions led by third party states.
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