Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy

Peksen, Dursun; Drury, A. Cooper

doi:10.1080/03050629.2010.502436

Cited by 178 publications

(102 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…The results are remarkable given that previous research has shown a robust negative impact of sanctions on democracy (Peksen and Drury 2010). Model 1 displays a positive, but insignificant, effect of sanctions on democratic development in targeted countries.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 49%

“…In contrast to comprehensive sanctions, which treat nations as unitary actors, these measures target particular individuals or groups (for an overview Biersteker et al 2005). However, existing research has rarely analyzed the specific effects that targeted sanctions exert on the power base in autocratic countries subjected to them (Brzoska 2001;Cortright and Lopez 2002;Drezner 2011;Eriksson 2011;Peksen and Drury 2010;Tostensen and Bull 2002).…”

Section: Sanctions and The Changed Global Environment After The Cold Warmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Sanctions and Democratization in the Post-Cold War Era

Soest

Wahman

2013

SSRN Journal

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Previous research, which has focused mostly on pre-1990 dynamics, has shown that sanctions have a negative impact on the level of democracy in targeted authoritarian countries. Given this finding, it is puzzling that democratization has become the most common goal of sanctions issued against authoritarian states. This paper studies how sanctions have affected democratization in targeted countries since the end of the Cold War and asks whether "democratic sanctions," those that explicitly aim to promote democracy, are in fact counterproductive. Contrary to the earlier research, this analysis demonstrates that sanctions do not generally decrease the level of democracy in targeted countries. Using a new data set covering sanctions for the period 1990-2010 and cross-sectional time-series analysis, the study shows that sanctions have an insignificant but positive democratic effect. More importantly, it finds that "democratic sanctions" have a statistically significant positive effect on democratic development in targeted countries. This positive outcome can be explained by the smaller selection effect associated with this specific sanction type. The high cost of conceding to "democratic sanctions" makes authoritarian regimes less likely to give in to senders' demands before sanctions are implemented. The high-cost argument is corroborated by a supplementary test that demonstrates that democratic sanctions in particular make authoritarian institutions and rulers more instable.

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 49%

Section: Sanctions and The Changed Global Environment After The Cold Warmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sanctions and Democratization in the Post-Cold War Era

Soest

Wahman

2013

SSRN Journal

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“…4 In addition, there has been puzzlingly little discussion on whether sanctions are mostly used as a reaction to authoritarian stability or democratic decline (Escribà-Folch & Wright, 2010;Escribà-Folch, 2012). Some authors state that sanctions are usually used as a reaction to drastic democratic deterioration (Laakso, Kivimäki & Seppänen, 2007), whereas others suggest that the most severe repressors are selected in the first place (Peksen & Drury, 2010;Peksen, 2009;Wood, 2008). Yet, there has not been a systematic analysis on how 'trigger variables', such as coups d'état, flawed elections or swift deterioration of human rights, in conjunction with structural variables, influence the decision to impose sanctions.…”

Section: Strategic Targeting Of Democratic Sanctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Not all dictators are equal

Soest

Wahman

2014

Journal of Peace Research

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Since the end of the Cold War, Western powers have frequently used sanctions to fight declining levels of democracy and human rights violations abroad. However, some of the world’s most repressive autocracies have never been subjected to sanctions, while other more competitive authoritarian regimes have been exposed to repeated sanction episodes. In this article, we concentrate on the cost–benefit analysis of Western senders that issue democratic sanctions, those which aim to instigate democratization, against authoritarian states. We argue that Western leaders weight domestic and international pressure to impose sanctions against the probability of sanction success and the sender’s own political and economic costs. Their cost–benefit calculus is fundamentally influenced by the strength of trigger events indicating infringements of democratic and human rights. Western sanction senders are most likely to respond to coups d’état, the most drastic trigger events, and tend to sanction vulnerable targets to a higher extent than stable authoritarian regimes. Senders are also more likely to sanction poor targets less integrated in the global economy and countries that do not align with the Western international political agenda, especially in responding to ‘weaker’ trigger events such as controversial elections. The analysis is carried out using a new dataset of US and EU sanctions against authoritarian states in the period 1990–2010.

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“…For example, economic sanctions are shown to negatively affect the targeted state's respect for human rights (Peksen, 2009;Wood, 2008) and to deter the development of democracy (Peksen and Drury, 2010). Even more striking, economic sanctions often appear to have devastating consequences on the overall quality of life for the citizens of the target state.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Always Affecting the Wrong People? The Impact of US Sanctions on Poverty

Neuenkirch

Neumeier

2015

SSRN Journal

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Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy

Cited by 178 publications

References 46 publications

Sanctions and Democratization in the Post-Cold War Era

Sanctions and Democratization in the Post-Cold War Era

Not all dictators are equal

Always Affecting the Wrong People? The Impact of US Sanctions on Poverty

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