Although the goals of the country's energy transition (Energiewende) are widely accepted in Germany, the specific route to get there is itself a matter of great controversy. The individual measures that are part of the energy transition policy and the questions of how they interact and how they are embedded in the European context are objects of controversial scientific and public debate. Most recently, the consequences for the price of electricity have, in particular, been discussed intensely. Against this backdrop of wide-ranging criticism, the future course for promoting renewable energy will soon be set. The German Renewable Energy Sources Act (the Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, EEG), which is the main instrument of energy transition policy with its feed-in tariffs, is supposed to be fundamentally revised in the course of this year. A precondition for achieving a coherent further development of the energy transition policy and for receiving the sound support of a critical public is that the long-term consequences of political decisions on a complex sociotechnical energy system be taken into account. The requirements of such a system are not satisfied by policy approaches or recommendations that target short-term effects or that are perceptions of problems extrapolated from individual sectors. On the basis of its integrated research on the energy transition, researchers from the Helmholtz Alliance Energy-Trans take a stand on current important controversial issues from the energy transformation and specify fundamental challenges to shaping a sustainable energy transition policy.Keywords: Energy transition; Sustainability; Germany; European Union; State aid; Renewable energy sources; Feed-in tariff; Federalism; Energy policy; Market designThe energy transition: a long-term project and a challenge to the system The energy transition in Germany is nothing less than the restructuring of the entire energy supply in the sectors' electricity, heat, and transportation in a highly industrialized country. This comprehensive reorganization is a task for generations, and yet the fundamental framework has to be created today. Although there continues to be a high level of approval in the general public [1][2][3][4] and among all political forces [5], essential components of the German energy transition policy are themselves currently being subject to criticism, some of it very intense. The focus of this criticism is most frequently on the renewable energy supports provided for the generation of electricity, which take the form of feed-in tariffs permitted by the Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien- Gesetz (EEG)).a Challenges to the energy transition go, however, far beyond this. What is required is a long-term process of transforming a complex sociotechnical system [6,7] in which the goal is to set the course of change so that tomorrow's energy supply works, its consumption of resources, and its impact on the environment are limited to a sustainable level, and, in the process, efficiency and social ac...
Although the objectives of the Energiewende (energy transition) are broadly accepted in Germany, the practical ways of achieving them remain highly contentious. In particular, the question of whether and how security of supply can be guaranteed over the course of this profound transformation of the energy system is currently the subject of controversy in the scientific and public debate. Recently, calls for additional payments to power plant operators for providing generation capacity have grown increasingly loud. But the introduction of capacity payments of this sort could have far-reaching consequences for the future organisation of Germany's electricity supply. Therefore, the political decision on this issue-which is scheduled for this year-should not be made without a sound scientific analysis. Basically, measures aimed at guaranteeing security of supply must address the possible causes of capacity shortages as broadly as possible. When designing such measures, besides security of supply, additional objectives such as cost-effectiveness and the environmental and social acceptability of electricity supply should also be taken into account. Capacity payments only partially meet these requirements. Moreover, once introduced, they are difficult to adapt, or revise even, to suit changing framework conditions. This is particularly problematic in view of the current lack of clear evidence for future security of supply problems. Therefore, introducing capacity payments at this point in time would not appear to be constructive. It would make more sense to introduce instead a mix of measures which would strengthen the electricity market, create conditions for feeding in electricity from renewable energy sources as and when required, and set incentives for the expansion of grid capacity, storage systems and demand side management. Should security of supply still appear uncertain under these changed framework conditions, the introduction of a strategic reserve, which would be held by the regulatory authority or the transmission system operator, is recommended-not, however, the creation of an entirely new, additional market segment in the form of a capacity market.
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK AND THE COST OF CAPITAL -THE CASE OF ELECTRICITY NETWORKS AbstractWe analyze the treatment and impact of idiosyncratic or firm-specific risk in regulation. Regulatory authorities regularly ignore firm-specific characteristics, such as size or asset ages, implying different risk exposure in incentive regulation. In contrast, it is common to apply only a single benchmark, the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), uniformly to all firms. This will lead to implicit discrimination. We combine models of firm-specific risk, liquidity management and regulatory rate setting to investigate impacts on capital costs. We focus on the example of the impact of component failures for electricity network operators. In a simulation model for Germany, we find that capital costs increase by approximately 0.2 to 3.0 percentage points depending on the size of the firm (in the range of 3% to 40% of total cost of capital). Regulation of monopolistic bottlenecks should take these risks into account to avoid implicit discrimination.
We propose a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach to estimate the impact of incentives on cost reduction. We show theoretically, and estimate empirically, that German electricity distribution system operators (DSOs) incur higher costs when subject to a lowerpowered regulation mechanism. The difference is particularly significant (about 7%) for firms in the upper quartile of the efficiency distribution, a pattern which is consistent with the pooling of types under the threat of ratcheting.JEL Class K23, L51, L94, L98, D24, D82 for valuable comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
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