The authors argue that complementary hostile and benevolent components of sexism exist across cultures. Male dominance creates hostile sexism (HS), but men's dependence on women fosters benevolent sexism (BS)--subjectively positive attitudes that put women on a pedestal but reinforce their subordination. Research with 15,000 men and women in 19 nations showed that (a) HS and BS are coherent constructs that correlate positively across nations, but (b) HS predicts the ascription of negative and BS the ascription of positive traits to women, (c) relative to men, women are more likely to reject HS than BS, especially when overall levels of sexism in a culture are high, and (d) national averages on BS and HS predict gender inequality across nations. These results challenge prevailing notions of prejudice as an antipathy in that BS (an affectionate, patronizing ideology) reflects inequality and is a cross-culturally pervasive complement to HS.

In Studies 1 and 2, after reading an acquaintance-rape but not a stranger-rape scenario, higher benevolent sexist but not hostile sexist participants blamed the victim significantly more. In Study 2, higher hostile sexist but not benevolent sexist male participants showed significantly greater proclivity to commit acquaintance (but not stranger) rape. Studies 3 and 4 supported the hypothesis that the effects of benevolent sexism and hostile sexism are mediated by different perceptions of the victim, as behaving inappropriately and as really wanting sex with the rapist. These findings show that benevolent sexism and hostile sexism underpin different assumptions about women that generate sexist reactions toward rape victims.

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We contrast two theoretical approaches to social influence, one stressing interpersonal dependence, conceptualized as normative and informational influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955), and the other stressing group membership, conceptualized as selfcategorization and referent informational influence (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). We argue that both social comparisons to reduce uncertainty and the existence of normative pressure to comply depend on perceiving the source of influence as belonging to one's own category. This study tested these two approaches using three influence paradigms. First we demonstrate that, in Sherifs (1936) autokinetic effect paradigm, the impact of confederates on the formation of a norm decreases as their membership of a different category is made more salient to subjects. Second, in the Asch (1956) conformity paradigm, surveillance effectively exerrs normative pressure ifdone by an in-group but not by an out-group. In-group influence decreases and out-group influence increases when subjects respond privately. Self-report data indicate that in-groupconfederates create more subjective uncertainty than out-group confederates and public responding seems to increase cohesiveness with in-group -but decrease it with out-group -sources of influence. In our third experiment we use the group polarization paradigm (e.g. Bumstein & Vinokur, 1973) to demonstrate that, when categorical differences between two subgroups within a discussion group are made salient, convergence of opinion between the subgroups is inhibited. Taken together the experiments show that self-categorization can be a crucial determining factor in social influence.

Stereotype threat effects arise when an individual feels at risk of confirming a negative stereotype about their group and consequently underperforms on stereotype relevant tasks (Steele, 2010). Among older people, underperformance across cognitive and physical tasks is hypothesized to result from age-based stereotype threat (ABST) because of negative age-stereotypes regarding older adults’ competence. The present review and meta-analyses examine 22 published and 10 unpublished articles, including 82 effect sizes (N = 3882) investigating ABST on older people’s (Mage = 69.5) performance. The analysis revealed a significant small-to-medium effect of ABST (d = .28) and important moderators of the effect size. Specifically, older adults are more vulnerable to ABST when (a) stereotype-based rather than fact-based manipulations are used (d = .52); (b) when performance is tested using cognitive measures (d = .36); and (c) occurs reliably when the dependent variable is measured proximally to the manipulation. The review raises important theoretical and methodological issues, and areas for future research.

We argue that prejudice should be investigated in the context of social-cognitive development and the interplay between morality and group identity. Our new perspective examines how children consider group identity (and group norms) along with their developing moral beliefs about fairness and justice. This is achieved by developing an integrated framework drawing on developmental and social psychological theories of prejudice. This synthesis results in a perspective that provides a more contextualized analysis of prejudice development than that previously offered by developmental theories. We describe research that supports our view that social norms, intergroup contact, and perceived outgroup threat affect the relative weight children place on moral and group-based criteria during the development of prejudice.

Participants evaluated other individuals who deviated in either an anti- or pro-normative direction relative to normative members. In Study 1, in-group gender-normative members were rated more positively than deviant members. The pro-norm deviant was viewed as more attractive than the anti-norm deviant. In Study 2 anti-norm in-group deviants were evaluated more negatively than anti-norm out-group deviants even though both held identical attitudes. In both studies, despite objective equivalence, pro-norm deviance was perceived as less "atypical" than anti-norm deviance. Judgments and reactions to deviance depend on group membership and the direction of deviance, not just its magnitude. Evaluations of deviants are also related to perceivers' identification with their own group. These findings are consistent with our model of subjective group dynamics.

The authors predicted that derogation of group deviants depends on the extent to which in-group norms or values are validated or undermined in a social context. In Experiment 1 participants were less tolerant and derogated in-group deviants more when other in-group members opposed the norm. In Experiment 2 participants derogated in-group deviants more than out-group deviants and than noncategorized individuals, but only when normative in-group members lacked uniformity. In Experiment 3 participants derogated in-group deviants more when there was uncertainty about in-group superiority. These results are consistent with previous research on the black sheep effect (J. M. Marques, V. Y. Yzerbyt, & J. -P. Leyens, 1988) and with the model of subjective group dynamics (D. Abrams, J. M. Marques, N. J. Bown, & M. Henson, 2000; J. M. Marques, D. Abrams, D. Paez, & C. Martinez-Taboada, 1998).