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Tor has become one of the most popular overlay networks for anonymizing TCP traffic. Its popularity is due in part to its perceived strong anonymity properties and its relatively low latency service. Low latency is achieved through Tor's ability to balance the traffic load by optimizing Tor router selection to probabilistically favor routers with highbandwidth capabilities.We investigate how Tor's routing optimizations impact its ability to provide strong anonymity. Through experiments conducted on PlanetLab, we show the extent to which routing performance optimizations have left the system vulnerable to end-to-end traffic analysis attacks from non-global adversaries with minimal resources. Further, we demonstrate that entry guards, added to mitigate path disruption attacks, are themselves vulnerable to attack. Finally, we explore solutions to improve Tor's current routing algorithms and propose alternative routing strategies that prevent some of the routing attacks used in our experiments.

The declining costs of commodity disk drives is rapidly changing the economics of deploying large amounts of online or near-line storage. Conventional mass storage systems use either high performance RAID clusters, automated tape libraries or a combination of tape and disk. In this paper, we analyze an alternative design using massive arrays of idle disks, or MAID. We argue that this storage organization provides storage densities matching or exceeding those of tape libraries with performance similar to disk arrays. Moreover, we show that with effective power management of individual drives, this performance can be achieved using a very small power budget. In particular, we show that our power management strategy can result in the performance comparable to an always-on RAID system while usingthe power of such a RAID system.

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The recent proliferation of wireless local area networks (WLAN) has introduced new location privacy risks. An adversary controlling several access points could triangulate a client's position. In addition, interface identifiers uniquely identify each client, allowing tracking of location over time. We enhance location privacy through frequent disposal of a client's interface identifier. The described system curbs the adversary's ability to continuously track a client's position. Design challenges include selecting new interface identifiers, detecting address collisions at the MAC layer, and timing identifier switches to balance network disruptions against privacy protection. Using a modified authentication protocol, network operators can still control access to their network. An analysis of a public WLAN usage trace shows that disposing addresses before reassociation already yields significant privacy improvements.