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When do firms derive value from investing in environmental initiatives (CEIs)?We examine stock market responses to the announcements of 183 CEIs by 71 Fortune 500 firms during the period 2002 to 2008. We find that the stock market reacts positively to such announcements but does not react differently to CEIs concerning a firm's inputs, throughputs, and outputs. We also find that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the timing of a CEI and the abnormal stock market return following its announcement. Overall, this study shows that timing is a relevant explanatory factor for the value firms derive from investing in environmental action..

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Corporate governance research is often limited in its ability to employ within-firm estimators, which address time-invariant endogeneity, when the variables of interest exhibit low time variation (for example, ownership and board independence). The problem is further exacerbated if data for multiple points in time needs to be hand-collected. We offer simulation-based methodological guidance to improve the statistical power of within-firm estimators in the presence of low time variation. We illustrate the usefulness of our simulation results by replicating two influential studies on ownership and board independence and extending them with a within-firm estimator. Based on widely used databases as well as a novel granular database, we document the different degrees and nature of time variation of ownership and board independence across jurisdictions and subgroups by listed status, family control and complexity of ownership structure. Researchers can use our findings to optimize the hand-collection and pre-processing of governance data and thereby increase statistical power and/or to distinguish whether lack of significance is due to low time variation as opposed to absence of a true relationship between their governance variable of interest and the respective outcome.

In this paper we propose a behavioral explanation for the survival of poorly performing asset managers. We argue that, in general, asset managers make use of copious amounts of correct but useless information to convince investors about their supposed superior ability to interpret the market. Their marketing skills and motivational speeches seem to be enough to maintain asset managers in business regardless of the results. We present data that show how bad a number of asset managers can be. We also show how prevalent asset managers’ underperformance is. We argue that some Wall Street professionals are able to fool almost all of their clients most of the time into believing that they add value in the services they provide while the data show that this is not true. What we cannot show with this data is whether managers actually believe they are as good as they claim they are, or are not just shamans, albeit shameless as well.

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