Substitutability and complementarity of corporate governance mechanisms in Latin America

Cueto, Diego C.

doi:10.1016/j.iref.2012.07.008

Cited by 25 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…The board of directors is often considered the primary internal control mechanism responsible for monitoring and controlling managers' opportunistic behavior in order to protect the shareholders' interests (Jensen, 1993;Cueto, 2013). Chen and Liu (2010) suggest that due to a conflict of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in emerging markets, effective monitoring from board of directors is very important to ensure reliable and complete financial reporting.…”

Section: Monitoring Effects Of Board Independence On Earnings Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Family firms and earnings management in Taiwan: Influence of corporate governance

Wen

Hung

Cheng

et al. 2015

International Review of Economics & Finance

166

107

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Section: Monitoring Effects Of Board Independence On Earnings Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Family firms and earnings management in Taiwan: Influence of corporate governance

Wen

Hung

Cheng

et al. 2015

International Review of Economics & Finance

166

107

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“…Crespi-Cladera e Garcia-Cestora (1999) mostraram que na Espanha os três principais acionistas detinham, em média, 47,1% do capital total das empresas. Segundo Cueto (2013), os três principais acionistas detinham 65,50% das ações com direito a voto na América-Latina, e no Brasil os acionistas detinham, em média, 55,76% do capital votante. Siqueira (1998), utilizando a metodologia de Demsetz e Lehn (1985), para uma amostra de 278 empresas brasileiras de capital aberto, observou que em 21,22% destas o capital total era disperso; em 48,20% o capital total era dominante e em 30,58% era majoritário.…”

Section: Trabalhos Empíricos Sobre Estrutura De Propriedade No Mundo unclassified

“…Alguns trabalhos empíricos foram realizados para determinar a estrutura de propriedade e controle das empresas não-financeiras brasileiras, destacando-se Siqueira (1998), Aldrighi e Mazzer Neto (2005e 2007, Gorga (2009) e Cueto (2013). Desses, apenas Gorga (2009) separa as empresas entre os diferentes níveis de governança da BM&FBovespa (mercado tradicional, N1, N2 e NM).…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Financeirização e governança corporativa: Um estudo sobre a estrutura de controle das empresas não-financeiras do Novo Mercado da BM&FBovespa.

Miranda

Crocco

Santos³

2017

BKR

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Fabiana Borges dos Santos ‡ Resumo O processo de financeirização tem afetado a governança das empresas não-financeiras, pois impõe a convergência das firmas ao modelo anglo-saxão de propriedade dispersa, maximizadora de riqueza ao acionista. Para entender como a financeirização tem afetado a governança das empresas não-financeiras deve-se conhecer sua estrutura de propriedade e controle. O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar a estrutura de controle das empresas nãofinanceiras do Novo Mercado (NM) da BM&FBovespa no ano de 2012. A amostra é composta por 118 empresas não-financeiras e, a estrutura de controle foi aberta para trás até encontrar o último e os três últimos acionistas. Os resultados mostraram que as famílias e os indivíduos são os principais acionistas, mas houve um aumento da participação dos investidores institucionais, bem como uma redução na concentração do controle da propriedade. Palavras-chave: Financeirização, Governança Corporativa; Controle da Propriedade.

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“…In Chile, Colombia, and Peru, it is shown that organizations resort to mechanisms such as leverage and offering shares on two or more exchanges to minimize the ownership concentration (Cueto, 2013). Similarly, corporate governance mechanisms such as power, confidence, and contracts are used in the development, implementation, and marketing stages, respectively, by companies in mobile service integrated value networks (Reuver & Bouwman, 2012).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Governance: International Context and Trends from 2005 to 2015

Jaimes-Valdez¹,

Hernández²,

Ochoa-Jimenez³

2017

IJBM

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Corporate governance is a topic that in recent years has been related to fraud and economic crises, which could be reasons for pessimism; however, this study views it as an opportunity to improve the organizational environment. Therefore, this exploratory study is conducted with the purpose of identifying the context in which corporate governance occurs and potential international trends. The review of the literature indicates that corporate governance codes based on the model of insider information are gradually being replaced by American and British models, which are characterized by democracy, transparency, and accountability. Similarly, there is emphasis on the importance of bringing organizations and interest groups closer together and building consensus to develop activities that are in the common interest and that provide benefits to all. Finally, further studies are recommended to improve national and international standards concerning corporate governance with the aim of balancing the interests of organizations and their stakeholders.

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Substitutability and complementarity of corporate governance mechanisms in Latin America

Cited by 25 publications

References 41 publications

Family firms and earnings management in Taiwan: Influence of corporate governance

Family firms and earnings management in Taiwan: Influence of corporate governance

Financeirização e governança corporativa: Um estudo sobre a estrutura de controle das empresas não-financeiras do Novo Mercado da BM&FBovespa.

Corporate Governance: International Context and Trends from 2005 to 2015

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