We examine whether the structure of executive compensation, specifically stock options relative to other forms of pay, is associated with opportunistic use of discretionary accruals in reported earnings. Prior research suggests that using options creates an incentive to temporarily depress the firm's stock price prior to the option award date, thereby lowering the exercise price of the options. We hypothesize, and find evidence, that relatively high option compensation is associated with income-decreasing discretionary accrual choices in periods leading up to option award dates. Furthermore, we find that this association is stronger when managers are able to publicly announce earnings prior to the option award date. Our results are consistent with the general implication from prior research that option compensation creates opportunistic incentives for managers to time the release of good and bad news to the market.

This study extends research into whether shareholder rights and disclosures of financial-related attributes are associated with firms' costs of equity capital. Using cost-of-equity-capital estimates derived from expected earnings growth valuation models, we find that firms with stronger shareholder rights regimes and higher levels of financial transparency are associated with significantly lower costs of equity capital. We also find evidence that greater financial disclosure and stronger rights regimes interact in reducing firms' costs of equity capital, such that the effect of a high level of one mechanism is minimal when it is combined with a low level of the other. Finally, we document that neither factor dominates the other in their associations, and that there are tradeoffs between disclosure levels and shareholder rights in their influence on firms' implied costs of equity capital. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2006Corporate governance, Shareholder rights, Disclosure, Cost of equity capital,

We investigate involuntary chief financial officer (CFO) turnover following earnings restatements, the labor market penalties imposed on former restatement-firm CFOs, and whether these disciplinary consequences have increased following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Our results suggest that relative to a control group of non-restating firms, firms restating earnings have higher rates of involuntary CFO turnover, and that former restatement-firm CFOs face stiff labor market penalties. We generally find that the passage of SOX has not increased involuntary CFO turnover rates following restatements. However, we find that labor market penalties for former CFOs of restatement firms are more severe in the post-SOX period, suggesting that SOX has increased ex post settling-up costs. Our results suggest that the influence of SOX on the labor market has resulted in CFOs being held more accountable for their actions.

SYNOPSIS: This archival study addresses whether the presence or absence of “bright lines” in a lease accounting standard influences the classification of leases as capital or operating. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first archival research to address the association between lease classification decisions and the use of U.S. GAAP and IFRS lease accounting standards. We examine firms' lease classification decisions using 2007–2009 data from a matched sample of members of the Fortune Global 500 that report under U.S. GAAP and IFRS. Consistent with experimental work by Agoglia et al. (2011), we find strong evidence that U.S. GAAP firms using a lease standard containing bright-line guidance (i.e., ASC 840) are more likely to classify leases as operating than IFRS firms adhering to a lease accounting standard that lacks the bright lines of the U.S. standard (i.e., IAS 17). Also consistent with Agoglia et al. (2011), we find little evidence of increased dispersion accompanying financial reporting under IFRS. In fact, we find some evidence suggesting the use of IFRS may actually lead to lower dispersion in reporting outcomes.