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We thank Jim Hunton (editor), Steven Kachelmeier (senior editor), and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful guidance. We appreciate the helpful comments from Alberto Dorantes, Michael Ettredge, Robert Examining the Potential Benefits of Internal Control Monitoring TechnologyABSTRACT: We analyze the potential benefits that firms can realize from implementing technology specifically aimed at monitoring the effectiveness of their internal control systems. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission asserts that effective internal control monitoring should enhance the efficiency of internal control processes, and in turn, the assurance over such processes (COSO 2009a). We develop hypotheses to test the realization of these potential benefits. Specifically, we identify a sample of firms that implemented internal control monitoring technology in response to the internal control requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Consistent with our hypotheses, we document that the implementation of internal control monitoring technology is associated with lower likelihood of material weaknesses, smaller increases in audit fees, and smaller increases in audit delays during the post-SOX time period. We discuss the potential implications of our findings for research related to continuous monitoring, client-provided assurance assistance, and information technology governance.

We investigate involuntary chief financial officer (CFO) turnover following earnings restatements, the labor market penalties imposed on former restatement-firm CFOs, and whether these disciplinary consequences have increased following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Our results suggest that relative to a control group of non-restating firms, firms restating earnings have higher rates of involuntary CFO turnover, and that former restatement-firm CFOs face stiff labor market penalties. We generally find that the passage of SOX has not increased involuntary CFO turnover rates following restatements. However, we find that labor market penalties for former CFOs of restatement firms are more severe in the post-SOX period, suggesting that SOX has increased ex post settling-up costs. Our results suggest that the influence of SOX on the labor market has resulted in CFOs being held more accountable for their actions.

SUMMARY We examine whether the readability of financial statement footnotes in the annual report is informative about audit engagement risk. Using various readability measures, we predict and find that firms with less readable footnotes have longer audit report lag, incur higher audit fees, and are more likely to receive a first time modified going concern opinion. We also show that readability of footnotes is associated with a higher likelihood of financial misstatements and future accounting-related litigation. Our results are robust to several measures of readability used in prior literature, as well as different specifications and design choices, revealing that financial statement footnote readability provides incremental information about audit engagement risk that affects auditor-client contracting. Data Availability: Data are obtained from public sources identified in the paper.

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