The development of commercially viable new products requires that technological and market possibilities are linked effectively in the product's design. Innovators in large firms have persistent problems with such linking, however. This research examines these problems by focusing on the shared interpretive schemes people use to make sense of product innovation. Two interpretive schemes are found to inhibit development of technology-market knowledge: departmental thought worlds and organizational product routines. The paper describes in some depth differences among the thought worlds which keep innovators from synthesizing their expertise. The paper also details how organizational routines exacerbate problems with learning, and how successful innovators overcome both interpretive barriers. The main implication of the study is that to improve innovation in large firms it is necessary to deal explicitly with the interpretive barriers described here. Suggestions for practice and research are offered.

Technology has been an important theme in the study of organizational form and function since the 1950s. However, organization science's interest in this relationship has declined significantly over the past 30 years, a period during which information technologies have become pervasive in organizations and brought about significant changes in them. Organizing no longer needs to take place around hierarchy and the collection, storage, and distribution of information as was the case with “command and control” bureaucracies in the past. The adoption of innovations in information technology (IT) and organizational practices since the 1990s now make it possible to organize around what can be done with information. These changes are not the result of information technologies per se, but of the combination of their features with organizational arrangements and practices that support their use. Yet concepts and theories of organizational form and function remain remarkably silent about these changes. Our analysis offers five affordances—visualizing entire work processes, real-time/flexible product and service innovation, virtual collaboration, mass collaboration, and simulation/synthetic reality—that can result from the intersection of technology and organizational features. We explore how these affordances can result in new forms of organizing. Examples from the articles in this special issue “Information Technology and Organizational Form and Function” are used to show the kinds of opportunities that are created in our understanding of organizations when the “black boxes” of technology and organization are simultaneously unpacked.

No abstract

This paper reports on a theory building effort to understand the persistent difficulties with successful product innovation in large, established firms. Drawing on an institutional approach, we suggest that the constituent activities of effective product innovation either violate established practice or fall into a vacuum where no shared understandings exist to make them meaningful. Product innovation, therefore, is illegitimate. This means that to enhance their innovative abilities, managers must weave the activities of product innovation into their institutionalized system of thought and action, not merely change structures or add values. We use insights from 134 innovators to identify the different ways that product innovation is illegitimate, and to consider alternate ways to overcome these problems. Exploratory results suggest that successful product innovators experience as many instances of illegitimacy as others, but creatively reframed their activities more often to legitimate their work. We conclude with some new insights for why barriers to innovation exist in large, established firms, and how those barriers can be managed.

Background Right ventricular (RV) failure after left ventricular assist device (LVAD) placement is a serious complication and is difficult to predict. In the era of destination therapy and the total artificial heart, predicting post-LVAD RV failure requiring mechanical support is extremely important. Methods We reviewed patient characteristics, laboratory values, and hemodynamic data from 266 patients who underwent LVAD placement at the University of Pennsylvania from April 1995 to June 2007. Results Of 266 LVAD recipients, 99 required RV assist device (BiVAD) placement (37%). We compared 36 parameters between LVAD (n=167) and BiVAD patients (n=99) to determine preoperative risk factors for RV assist device (RVAD) need. By univariate analysis, 23 variables showed statistically significant differences between the two groups (P ≤ 0.05). By multivariate logistic regression, cardiac index ≤ 2.2 L/min·m2 (odds ratio [OR] 5.7), RV stroke work index ≤ 0.25 mmHg·mL/m2 (OR 5.1), severe preoperative RV dysfunction (OR 5.0), preoperative creatinine ≥ 1.9 mg/dL (OR 4.8), previous cardiac surgery (OR 4.5), and systolic blood pressure ≤ 96 mmHg (OR 2.9) were the best predictors of RVAD need. Conclusions The most significant predictors for RVAD need were cardiac index, RV stroke work index, severe preoperative RV dysfunction, creatinine, previous cardiac surgery, and systolic blood pressure. Using these, we constructed an algorithm which can predict which LVAD patients will require RVAD with greater than 80% sensitivity and specificity.

No abstract

Objective It is generally accepted that patients who require biventricular mechanical support (BiVAD) have poorer outcomes than those requiring isolated left ventricular support (LVAD). However, it is unknown how the timing of BiVAD insertion affects outcomes. We hypothesized that planned BiVAD insertion improves survival compared to delayed conversion of LVAD to BiVAD. Methods We reviewed and compared outcomes of 266 patients undergoing LVAD or BiVAD placement at the University of Pennsylvania from April 1995 to June 2007. We subdivided BiVAD patients into planned BiVAD (P-BiVAD) and delayed BiVAD (D-BiVAD) groups, based on the timing of RVAD insertion. We defined D-BiVAD as any failure of isolated LVAD support. Results Of 266 LVAD patients, 99 required BiVAD (37%). We compared preoperative characteristics, successful bridging to transplant, survival to hospital discharge, and Kaplan-Meier one-year survival between P-BiVAD (n=71) and D-BiVAD (n=28) groups. Preoperative comparison showed that patients who ultimately require biventricular support have similar preoperative status. LVAD (n=167) outcomes in all categories exceeded both P-BiVAD and D-BiVAD outcomes. Further, P-BiVAD patients had superior survival to discharge than D-BiVAD patients (51% v 29% p<0.05). One-year and long-term Kaplan-Meier survival distribution confirmed this finding. There was also a trend towards improved bridging to transplant in P-BiVAD (n=55) vs. D-BiVAD (n=22) patients (65% v 45% p=0.10). Conclusion When patients at risk for isolated LVAD support failure are identified, proceeding directly to BiVAD implantation is advised, as early institution of biventricular support results in dramatic improvement in survival.

F or many sectors like health care, financial services, or renewable energy, new products and services are generated by an ecology of business firms, nonprofit foundations, public institutions, and other agents. Knowledge to innovate is dispersed across ecologies, so no single firm or small group of firms can innovate alone. Moreover, many new products and services in ecologies such as health care or energy are complex or comprise many parts with unknown interactions. New products, knowledge, business models, and applications all emerge unpredictably over considerable time periods, as various agents in the ecologies of innovation interact with and react to the actions of others. However, the existing organizing structure in these ecologies stifles emergence and precludes much innovation, simply because theory and practice do not adequately address how to organize for complex innovation. We develop a preliminary model for organizing ecologies of complex innovation. We suggest that innovations can continually emerge productively if people work locally in ecologies to set and solve problems of orchestrating knowledge capabilities across the ecology, strategizing across the ecology to create new businesses and applications, and developing public policies to embrace ambiguity. Using examples from biopharmaceuticals and alternative energy, we develop specific organizing ideas that can be examined and elaborated upon. This new direction for organization science integrates existing ideas around a new kind of organizing and shows how organization science can add real value in addressing major challenges of public welfare and safety in the 21st century.