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Ethnobiology has become increasingly concerned with applied and normative issues, such as climate change adaptation, forest management, and sustainable agriculture. Applied ethnobiology emphasizes the practical importance of local and traditional knowledge in tackling these issues but thereby also raises complex theoretical questions about the integration of heterogeneous knowledge systems. The aim of this article is to develop a framework for addressing questions of integration through four core domains of philosophy—epistemology, ontology, value theory, and political theory. In each of these dimensions, we argue for a model of “partial overlaps” that acknowledges both substantial similarities and differences between knowledge systems. While overlaps can ground successful collaboration, their partiality requires reflectivity about the limitations of collaboration and co-creation. By outlining such a general and programmatic framework, the article aims to contribute to developing “philosophy of ethnobiology” as a field of interdisciplinary exchange that provides new resources for addressing foundational issues in ethnobiology and also expands the agenda of philosophy of biology.

Change in Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) is not easily understood in terms of Western innovation discourses. In fact, innovations in the sense of modern and growth-oriented technologies are common sources for the erosion of TEK. This article brings together current literatures on TEK and innovation studies in addressing questions about the governance of socioecological change. First, we connect TEK to shifting meanings of 'innovation' that emphasize contributions to societal goals rather than economic growth or technological modernization. Second, we situate these shifts in governance frameworks of 'responsible innovation'. Third, we argue that the case for self-determination of traditional communities also identifies limits of integrating TEK with recent innovation discourses. As change in traditional communities is part of a wider political set of struggles about conditions of change and decolonization, debates about innovation require engagement with underlying social justice issues beyond mainstream debates about responsible governance. ARTICLE HISTORY

This article uses the case study of ethnobiological classification to develop a positive and a negative thesis about the state of natural kind debates. On the one hand, I argue that current accounts of natural kinds can be integrated in a multidimensional framework that advances understanding of classificatory practices in ethnobiology. On the other hand, I argue that such a multidimensional framework does not leave any substantial work for the notion "natural kind" and that attempts to formulate a general account of naturalness have become an obstacle to understanding classificatory practices. In the case of ethnobiology, different accounts of natural kinds pick out different relevant subsets of ethnotaxa but there is nothing to be learnt from the question which subset should qualify as the set of natural kinds.

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This special section addresses Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) as an increasingly global concept that is translated and transformed in heterogenous national contexts. Based on seven national perspective articles from the RRI-Practice project, this introduction outlines a framework of transduction through which RRI becomes contextually negotiated and reconfigured. Read together, the national explorations of the special section make visible aspects of responsibility not readily apparent in abstract, European or global scale discussions of RRI. They not only point up important particularities of national contexts, but unexpected points of overlap in national contexts not often thought to have distinct commonalities.

The aim of this article is to develop an argument against metaphysical debates about the existence of human races. I argue that the ontology of race is underdetermined by both empirical and nonempirical evidence owing to a plurality of equally permissible candidate meanings of "race." Furthermore, I argue that this underdetermination leads to a deflationist diagnosis according to which disputes about the existence of human races are nonsubstantive verbal disputes. While this diagnosis resembles general deflationist strategies in contemporary metaphysics, I show that my argument does not presuppose controversial metametaphysical assumptions.

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