Letting Go of “Natural Kind”: Toward a Multidimensional Framework of Nonarbitrary Classification

Ludwig, David

doi:10.1086/694835

Cited by 29 publications

(46 citation statements)

References 56 publications

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“…Indeed, there are cross-cultural ontological similarities that provide the basis for collaborative ethnobiological practices which would often not be possible without joint recognition of the same biological species. However, there are also ontological differences that matter because they often reflect different priorities and concerns about biological and ecological properties (Ludwig 2018a). Rather than pushing for a universalist emphasis on cross-cultural similarities or a relativist emphasis on differences, a model of partial overlaps suggests a more nuanced picture of the relations among ontologies.…”

Section: Partial Overlaps In Ontologiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Philosophy of Ethnobiology: Understanding Knowledge Integration and Its Limitations

Ludwig¹,

El-Hani

2020

Journal of Ethnobiology

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Ethnobiology has become increasingly concerned with applied and normative issues, such as climate change adaptation, forest management, and sustainable agriculture. Applied ethnobiology emphasizes the practical importance of local and traditional knowledge in tackling these issues but thereby also raises complex theoretical questions about the integration of heterogeneous knowledge systems. The aim of this article is to develop a framework for addressing questions of integration through four core domains of philosophy—epistemology, ontology, value theory, and political theory. In each of these dimensions, we argue for a model of “partial overlaps” that acknowledges both substantial similarities and differences between knowledge systems. While overlaps can ground successful collaboration, their partiality requires reflectivity about the limitations of collaboration and co-creation. By outlining such a general and programmatic framework, the article aims to contribute to developing “philosophy of ethnobiology” as a field of interdisciplinary exchange that provides new resources for addressing foundational issues in ethnobiology and also expands the agenda of philosophy of biology.

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Section: Partial Overlaps In Ontologiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Philosophy of Ethnobiology: Understanding Knowledge Integration and Its Limitations

Ludwig¹,

El-Hani

2020

Journal of Ethnobiology

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“…Rather, what we claim is that PCK* is a more adequate and more naturalistic view of certain kinds characterized by non-perfect co-occurrence of properties and fuzzy boundaries, such as the case of living systems in general (specifically, more adequate and naturalistic than HPC). Natural kinds come in different varieties (Reydon 2009;Ereshefsky and Reydon 2015) and it has already been argued that it is unlikely that any attempts to come up with a general account of natural kinds will succeed (Ludwig 2018). As other philosophers do, we fail to see this as an unacceptable situation: Arguably Hacking's argument against natural kinds is compelling because of a strong underlying presumption of the unity of science in some form or other in discussions of natural kinds.…”

Section: Final Remarksmentioning

confidence: 97%

“Dealing with the changeable and blurry edges of living things: a modified version of property-cluster kinds”

Ruiz

Umerez

2018

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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Despite many attempts to achieve an adequate definition of living systems by means of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, the opinion that such an enterprise is inexorably destined to fail is increasingly gaining support. However, we believe options do not just come down to either having faith in a future success or endorsing skepticism. In this paper, we aim to redirect the discussion of the problem by shifting the focus of attention from strict definitions (in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions) towards a philosophical framework that allows conceiving of living systems as a natural kind, but whereby natural kinds are not to be defined by fixed necessary and sufficient conditions. We argue for a property-cluster kind approach according to which living systems constitute a natural kind with vague boundaries, capable of changing, and whose members do not need to instantiate every property. We draw from Boyd's homeostatic property-cluster theory and introduce two modifications, one regarding homeostatic mechanisms and another related to the scientific role of kinds. Thus, our view overcomes some difficulties of Boyd's theory and we are able to account for the natural kindhood of living things. We also emphasize the most appealing features of our approach for specific research fields and address three objections to this sort of approach.

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“…Despite the lively debate about natural kinds, David Ludwig (2018) and Ian Hacking (2007) have called for eliminating the concept. Their arguments for this start from a double heterogeneity.…”

Section: Natural Kind Eliminativismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This paper will apply this pragmatic framework, which stems from debates about scientific concepts, to the philosophical concept of 'natural kinds'. Like species and genes, this concept has been the subject of eliminativist claims on the basis of its fragmentation and its seeming uselessness (Hacking 2007;Ludwig 2018). Arguing against such eliminativism, we will highlight a valuable and overlooked epistemic role that the concept plays in philosophy.…”

Section: Introduction: Pluralism and Eliminativismmentioning

confidence: 97%

Against natural kind eliminativism

Conix

Chi

2020

Synthese

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It has recently been argued that the concept of natural kinds should be eliminated because it does not play a productive theoretical role and even harms philosophical research on scientific classification. We argue that this justification for eliminativism fails because the notion of 'natural kinds' plays another epistemic role in philosophical research, namely, it enables fruitful investigation into nonarbitrary classification. It does this in two ways: first, by providing a fruitful investigative entry into scientific classification; and second-as is supported by bibliometric evidence-by tying together a research community devoted to non-arbitrary classification. The question of eliminativism then requires weighing off the benefits of retaining the concept against its harms. We argue that the progressive state of philosophical work on natural kinds tips this balance in favour of retaining the concept.

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Letting Go of “Natural Kind”: Toward a Multidimensional Framework of Nonarbitrary Classification

Cited by 29 publications

References 56 publications

Philosophy of Ethnobiology: Understanding Knowledge Integration and Its Limitations

Philosophy of Ethnobiology: Understanding Knowledge Integration and Its Limitations

“Dealing with the changeable and blurry edges of living things: a modified version of property-cluster kinds”

Against natural kind eliminativism

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