“Dealing with the changeable and blurry edges of living things: a modified version of property-cluster kinds”

Abstract

Despite many attempts to achieve an adequate definition of living systems by means of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, the opinion that such an enterprise is inexorably destined to fail is increasingly gaining support. However, we believe options do not just come down to either having faith in a future success or endorsing skepticism. In this paper, we aim to redirect the discussion of the problem by shifting the focus of attention from strict definitions (in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions) towards a philosophical framework that allows conceiving of living systems as a natural kind, but whereby natural kinds are not to be defined by fixed necessary and sufficient conditions. We argue for a property-cluster kind approach according to which living systems constitute a natural kind with vague boundaries, capable of changing, and whose members do not need to instantiate every property. We draw from Boyd's homeostatic property-cluster theory and introduce two modifications, one regarding homeostatic mechanisms and another related to the scientific role of kinds. Thus, our view overcomes some difficulties of Boyd's theory and we are able to account for the natural kindhood of living things. We also emphasize the most appealing features of our approach for specific research fields and address three objections to this sort of approach.

Quaderns de filosofia VI, 2

“…In Craver's opinion, the choice is given by the interests of the researchers, what it means to overcome the metaphysical priority implicit in Boyd's proposal. Ferreira and Umerez (2018) propose some modifications on the basic homeostatic theory in order to solve their problems. Thus, based on the idea of stability developed by Slater (2015), they modify some of the most problematic aspects, such as the role of mechanisms.…”

“…Therefore, to get an idea of the complete picture, we must add the proposals that have emerged since 2002. Simply as a sample, point out the contributions of Gánti (2003), Ruiz-Mirazo, Peretó and Moreno (2004), Benner (2010), Damiano and Luisi (2010), Tsokolov (2010), Trifonov (2011), Diéguez (2008;, Razeto-Barry and Ramos-Jiliberto (2013), Luisi (2015), Hermida (2016), Ferreira andUmerez (2018), or Smith (2018). The number of different proposals, as can be seen, far exceeds one hundred.…”

“…But is it possible to define life considering a different way? In this vein, some authors as Diéguez (2008;, and more recently Ferreira and Umerez (2018), have explored some alternatives based on the ideas of homeostatic kinds and relevant stability.…”

Healing Pattern: A Natural Kind in Nursing?

“…This HCP view has been developed and widely adopted in its original as well as modified versions. Generally, property-cluster views describe natural kinds in reference to categories with fuzzy boundaries (Ferreira Ruiz & Umerez, 2018), where properties are “contingently clustered” (Boyd, 1988) and are neither fixed nor law-like and may change over time in relation to each other or to the context. The naturally, co-occurring properties of a natural kind cluster together— based not upon some essence but on some underlying self-regulating mechanism.…”

Defining Life as a Non-Essentialist Natural Kind

“…Therefore, to get an idea of the complete picture, we must add the proposals that have emerged since 2002. Simply as a sample, point out the contributions of Gánti (2003), Ruiz-Mirazo, Peretó and Moreno (2004), Benner (2010), Damiano and Luisi (2010), Tsokolov (2010), Trifonov (2011), Diéguez (2008;, Razeto-Barry and Ramos-Jiliberto (2013), Luisi (2015), Hermida (2016), Ferreira and Umerez (2018), or Smith (2018). The number of different proposals, as can be seen, far exceeds one hundred.…”