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Purpose of this paperThe purpose of this paper is to engage in a comprehensive review of the research on strategic alliances in the last decade. Design/methodology/approachAfter presenting a typology of diverse alliance governance forms, we review recent analyses of alliance formation, implementation management, and performance outcomes of collaborative activities. FindingsStrategic alliances developed and propagated as formalized interorganizational relationships. These cooperative arrangements represent new organizational formation that seeks to achieve organizational objectives better through collaboration than through competition. Practical implications (if applicable)The paper provides future research directions on partner selection, networks patterns and processes, understanding the integration in alliances through fusion, fission, and how to manage developmental dynamics.What is original/value of paper We conclude with some future directions for theory construction and empirical research.

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JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. American Sociological Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to American Sociological Review. The effects of members' interests in incentives offered by collective-actionorganizations are examined with data from a national sample of American associations. Members expressed interests in six distinct dimensions underlying organizational-incentive systems, and these different aspects are specifically related to different types of member involvement, controlling for other personal and organizational attributes. Members with higher interests in normative and social inducements offered by their organizations are more likely to contribute time, money, and psychological commitment and to engage in internal participatory actions. Lobbying incentives are strongly related to external participation. Overtly utilitarian incentives such as material benefits, occupational rewards, and informational incentives are either unrelated to involvement or actually attract members unwilling to participate. The implications of these results for Olson's "by-product" or selective-incentive explanation of collective action are discussed.

Drawing on a recent survey of establishments in the United States, the authors examine how nonprofit, public, and for-profit establishments vary in the use of high-performance work organization (HPWO) practices that offer opportunities for participation in decision making (via self-directed teams and offline committees), enhance the capacity for participation (via multiskilling practices such as job rotation), and provide incentives for participation (via compensation practices). Nonprofit and public organizations are less likely to use performance incentives (gain sharing and bonuses) and some multiskilling practices than are for-profit organizations but more likely to use both self-directed work teams and offline committees. Sectoral differences in the prevalence of incentive compensation and self-directed teams persist after correlates of sector that predict HPWO prevalence—including establishment size, industry, computational requirements, and unionization—are controlled.

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