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This paper reverses the standard conclusion that asymmetric information plus competition results in insu cient insurance provision. Risk-tolerant individuals take few precautions and are disinclined to insure, but are drawn into a pooling equilibrium by the low premiums createdbythepresence of safer, more risk-averse types. Taxing insurance drives out the reckless clients, allowing a strict Pareto gain. This result depends on administrative costs in processing claims and issuing policies, as does the novel nding of a pure-strategy, partial-pooling, sub-game-perfect, Nash equilibrium in the insurance market. We would like to thank Heskey Bar-Issac, John Black, George Bulkley, Konstantinos Koufopoulos and especially the Editor Lars Stole and two referees for exceptionally helpful comments. Wewould also like to thank seminar participants at Universities of Bologna, Bocconi, Edinbugh, Exeter, Oxford, CEMFI, LSE and EARIE 2000 for useful discussions.

2-CdA is active in LCH. It produces a higher response rate in patients with low-risk multisystem or multifocal bone disease than those with risk organ involvement. "Risk" patients who fail to respond to 2-CdA have a high mortality. Patient age at 2-CdA therapy and length of time from diagnosis to 2-CdA significantly affect response and survival.

Power spectra of geomagnetic field variations measured at synchronous equatorial altitude (geomagnetic shell parameter L ∼ 6.6) in the magnetosphere are used to calculate the time dependence of the radial diffusion coefficient for particles in the radiation belts. The diffusion coefficients calculated are mainly applicable for relativistic electrons. The magnitudes of the derived diffusion coefficients using data only from local day observations are consistent with those reported from analyses of most particle observations and thus are slightly larger than those derived from magnetic sudden commencements. They are consistent with the diffusion coefficients calculated from power spectra of ground‐based geomagnetic data measured near L = 4.

Empirical evidence suggests that capital-market constraints prevent low-wealth individuals from setting up in business. This paper shows this ®nding to be consistent with socially excessive lending and an interest-rate tax being welfare-improving. One feature of the model, banks' inability to identify entrepreneurial quality, leads to excessive bank lending and investment in low-return projects. The reduction in the probability of bankruptcy lowers the cost of borrowing and eliminates deadweight costs and hence promotes entry. If the incentive effects are suf®ciently large, wealth and the volume of entrepreneurial activity move together. A key result of the paper is to show that a market equilibrium in which there is a positive relationship between entry and the level of wealth is consistent with either subsidies to inactivity or taxes on interest raising welfare.

An educated citizenry that participates in and contributes to science technology engineering and mathematics innovation in the 21st century will require broad literacy and skills in computer science (CS). School systems will need to give increased attention to opportunities for students to engage in computational thinking and ways to promote a deeper understanding of how technologies and software are used as design tools. However, K-12 students in the United States are facing a broken pipeline for CS education. In response to this problem, we have developed the Scalable Game Design curriculum based on a strategy to integrate CS education into the regular school curriculum. This strategy includes opportunities for students to design and program games and science technology engineering and mathematics simulations. An approach called Computational Thinking Pattern Analysis has been developed to measure and correlate computational thinking skills relevant to game design and simulations. Results from a study with more than 10,000 students demonstrate rapid adoption of this curriculum by teachers from multiple disciplines, high student motivation, high levels of participation by women, and interest regardless of demographic background. . 2015. Scalable game design: A strategy to bring systemic computer science education to schools through game design and simulation creation. ACM Trans. Comput.

Compensation schemes often reward success but do not penalize failure. Fixed salaries with stock options or bonuses have this feature. Yet the standard principal-agent model implies that pay is normally monotonically increasing in performance. This paper shows that, under loss aversion, there will be intervals over which pay is insensitive to performance, with the use of carrots but not sticks is frequently optimal, especially when risk aversion is low and reference income is endogenous. A further benefit of capping losses, for example through options, is to discourage reckless behavior by executives seeking to resurrect their fortunes. (JEL: F3, F4)

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