During the last decade a good deal of discussion of the “communitarian critique” of liberalism has occurred. The debate is perplexing for a number of reasons. The competing positions are often difficult to characterize (or, sometimes, even to distinguish) and it is often unclear what would be the thèoretical or practical significance of affirming one position over the other. In this “guide for the perplexed” the authors discuss two ambiguities and two problems which they believe are central to the debate. Examining these problems and ambiguities suggests some distinctions and confusions, strengths and weaknesses, characteristic of both communitarian and liberal arguments.
Discussions of the implications of Arrow's theorem for majority rule have typically focused on calculating the probability of the paradox of voting. In doing so, these analyses have ignored another significant problem of preference aggregation in n‐way (n > 2) elections, the existence of non‐Condorcet winners, when a Condorcet alternative is available, under a simple plurality criterion. At the level of the democratic political system, e.g., a proposed national presidential primary or any electoral subsystem, e.g., state presidential primaries, gubernatorial, senatorial elections, the simple plurality criterion may distort electoral preferences by failing to select an available Condorcet candidate. An algorithm for calculating the probability of such plurality distortion is offered, and probability calculations for three‐way elections for small electorates are presented. Most notable is the discovery that single‐peaked preferences, while reducing or eliminating the probability of the paradox, lead to a concomitant increase in the probability of plurality distortion. In instances in which no candidate receives half the vote and preferences are single‐peaked, the probability of plurality distortion is actually greater than the probability of plurality‐Condorcet coincidence. These results cast some doubt on the validity of the plurality criterion as a voting procedure as well as indicating some of the difficulties inherent in the Condorcet criterion. Alternatives to the plurality criterion are discussed, and some preliminary tests of these alternatives are made.
Much of the rhetoric concerning educational reform has focused on the role of education in improving economic competitiveness and productivity. This article notes some of the difficulties in assuming strong links between education and the economy, especially given our limited understanding of the relationship of education and job skills. These difficulties raise serious policy issues about the aims of public education and the relationship(s) of schools to other institutions.
The movement for education reform is currently moving on two distinct tracks. One emphasizes national policies, especially subject-area standards. The other focuses on local control and experimentation through restructuring and charters. This article examines some of the strengths and weaknesses of each strategy and their consistency with one another The suggestion here is that it is difficult to combine the contemporary rhetoric of national aims with the culture of belief-often found in charter schools-that is crucial to local reform. A more realistic view of reform would be less concerned with competitiveness or elaborate standards and, within a looser structure that includes charter schools, more concerned with basic skills and habits.
I examine the search for a “tie that binds, “ or “core” values, in liberal political theory, specifically Rawls's recent arguments, and in proposals concerning moral education in the public schools. Both Rawls and the proponents of moral education appeal to consensus or shared values, but the search for core values in both theory and practice is only partly successful. Specifically, this search is misguided insofar as it does not reflect how values are embedded in specific institutions and practices. The various forms of moral education in the public schools, both implicit and explicit, illustrate a consensus about a range of moral and intellectual virtues that is broader and more complex than arguments for core values allow. Comparing arguments concerning core values in political theory and moral education suggests how liberal political theory might deal with questions of consensus, justification, and the task of political theory generally.
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