Students of citizen participation in public affairs disagree as to the effectiveness of such citizen involvement. Using the General Revenue Sharing program as a case study and applying techniques of both cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis, this article examines the effectiveness of one form of citizen participation, the public hearing. It is found that in the revenue-sharing program, the public hearing did have an immediate, but only short-term, impact on levels of public interest and citizen involvement. Evidence to support some short-term and some long-term effects on reported expenditure decisions is presented; however, these impacts generally are found to be inconsequential and not statistically significant. It is concluded that, as a form of citizen participation, the public hearing—at least as demonstrated in the General Revenue Sharing program—has not had much of an impact on citizen behavior or policy choices.

This article compares expenditure decisions in four "Western" democracies (Australia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States) in the policy areas of defense, health, education, and all government expenditures from 1950 to 1970. In addition, national income is used as a measure of economic growth in the four countries. The research focuses on the yearly fluctuations of expenditures and the statistical relationships existing among the variables under changing conditions.The research indicates significant departure from prior research findings and suggests that the assumption of an explicit trade-off between defense and welfare expenditures be reconsidered. In addition, when varying economic growth was examined, the research again indicates the need for reconsideration of prior relationships. Throughout, the article encourages the development of comparative policy research and theory and recommends the development of careful theoretical and methodological constructs.

Modern presidents must be attentive to influences of the federal bureaucracy on their policy initiatives and all attempt some measure of bureaucratic control. This article assesses the extent of President Nixon's success in gaining some degree of management control over the bureaucracy through the manipulation of the civil service personnel system. We find that Republicans were, in fact, more likely to be selected to top career positions during the Nixon years. We find also that career executives calling themselves Independents were more likely during the Nixon years than before to resemble Republican executives in their support of Nixon's policies and goals. This is significant to presidential control because of the large number of bureaucrats calling themselves Independents. We conclude that Independent career executives may provide a president with a considerable reservoir of bureaucratic support.

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