This article analyzes the consequences of nonrandom sample selection for continuous-time duration analyses and develops a new estimator to correct for it when necessary. We conduct a series of Monte Carlo analyses that estimate common duration models as well as our proposed duration model with selection. These simulations show that ignoring sample selection issues can lead to biased parameter estimates, including the appearance of (nonexistent) duration dependence. In addition, our proposed estimator is found to be superior in root mean-square error terms when nontrivial amounts of selection are present. Finally, we provide an empirical application of our method by studying whether self-selectivity is a problem for studies of leaders' survival during and following militarized conflicts.
Past studies of U.S. foreign aid and UN voting have not taken into account the different incentives of leaders based on regime type. Democratic and nondemocratic leaders use different means to remain in power, conditioning their response to foreign aid. Nondemocratic leaders can use foreign aid to provide private goods to elites ensuring continued support or to improve their coercive capabilities to maintain power. Democratic leaders can use neither of these tools, as their tenure requires mass support. This means nondemocracies are more likely than democracies to change their voting behavior in the UN to match donor preferences. Controlling for the influence of regime type allows us to test for when foreign aid is an effective tool of state policy. We find that nondemocratic state leaders respond to increased foreign aid by voting with the U.S. in the UN, whereas democratic leaders are nonresponsive to foreign aid.
This study develops a dynamic model of the rivalry process, explicitly connecting the conflicts that form rivalries. The model demonstrates how these conflicts combine to form an especially conflict-prone relationship. Using numerical simulations of the model, I deduce and test a hypothesis connecting dyadic conflict and rivalry termination. High-concentration conflicts increase the probability of rivalry termination by causing a sharp and sustained drop in public support for future military action. Dyadic conflict between rivals can bring peace, under the right circumstances. The article concludes with a discussion of the model's implications for policymakers seeking to limit international violence.
We argue that international organizations decrease the duration of international conflicts by mitigating commitment problems and encouraging combatants to cease hostilities more quickly. Empirical analyses of militarized interstate dispute duration reveal that increasing shared international organization (IO) participation reduces the length of disputes, even after accounting for selection into international conflict. We also find that international organizations designed to mitigate commitment problems decrease dispute duration, while IOs capable of reducing information asymmetries do not influence dispute length.Over the last decade, an exciting research agenda has developed on the ability of international organizations (IOs) to procure peace. Much of this research focuses on the ability of IOs to prevent conflict onset between states, and scholars continue to refine our knowledge of which organizations are most effective in decreasing the likelihood of a dispute (Russett and Oneal 2001; Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004). Yet by solely investigating the relationship between institutions and the absence of conflict, we miss other means by which IOs may procure peace. While international organizations seek to prevent conflict onset, they also strive to shorten the duration of disputes. Consider the variety of efforts by IOs to manage the 1998-2000 conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. A number of institutions, including the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), sought to shorten the dispute by pressuring for a cease-fire between the two parties. The OAU also brokered negotiations between 1 We thank Kevin Clarke, Brian Lai, Tim Nordstrom, and Clayton Thyne for helpful comments. All authors contributed equally to the development of the article. Their names are listed in reverse alphabetical order. Data used in this article can be downloaded from
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