The Influence of International Organizations on Militarized Dispute Initiation and Duration1

Abstract

We argue that international organizations decrease the duration of international conflicts by mitigating commitment problems and encouraging combatants to cease hostilities more quickly. Empirical analyses of militarized interstate dispute duration reveal that increasing shared international organization (IO) participation reduces the length of disputes, even after accounting for selection into international conflict. We also find that international organizations designed to mitigate commitment problems decrease dispute duration, while IOs capable of reducing information asymmetries do not influence dispute length.Over the last decade, an exciting research agenda has developed on the ability of international organizations (IOs) to procure peace. Much of this research focuses on the ability of IOs to prevent conflict onset between states, and scholars continue to refine our knowledge of which organizations are most effective in decreasing the likelihood of a dispute (Russett and Oneal 2001; Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004). Yet by solely investigating the relationship between institutions and the absence of conflict, we miss other means by which IOs may procure peace. While international organizations seek to prevent conflict onset, they also strive to shorten the duration of disputes. Consider the variety of efforts by IOs to manage the 1998-2000 conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. A number of institutions, including the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), sought to shorten the dispute by pressuring for a cease-fire between the two parties. The OAU also brokered negotiations between 1 We thank Kevin Clarke, Brian Lai, Tim Nordstrom, and Clayton Thyne for helpful comments. All authors contributed equally to the development of the article. Their names are listed in reverse alphabetical order. Data used in this article can be downloaded from

Testing the Value of the Postwar International Order

“…190-191;and HafnerBurton, von Stein, and Gartzke, 2008, p. 177. See also Russett, Oneal, and Davis, 1998;Simmons, 2002;and Shannon, Morey, and Boehmke, 2010. commitments from participating states helped to reduce the length of militarized interstate disputes. 17 One important recent study, drawing on both theory and empirical assessments of conflict trends, argues that institutions are the critical mechanisms for dampening conflict among democracies.…”

“…21 Some of these peacekeeping operations (PKOs) 17 Shannon, Morey, and Boehmke, 2010. 18 Hasenclever and Weiffen, 2006. 19 Pevehouse and Russett, 2006. 20 Haass, 2009, pp.…”

Every Story Has a Beginning, Middle, and an End (But Not Always in That Order): Predicting Duration Dynamics in a Unified Framework

“…In the sense that one can interpret any binary time-series cross-sectional models as an application of survival analysis [Beck et al, 1998, Carter andSignorino, 2010], survival analysis is arguably the single most predominant mode of analysis in conflict research. Scholars of international and civil conflict have utilized the technique of survival analysis to study the duration of conflict (i.e., conflict termination) [e.g., Balch-Lindsay et al, 2008, Bennett and Stam, 1998, 1996, Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2004, Cunningham et al, 2009, Fearon, 2004, Glassmyer and Sambanis, 2008, Goemans, 2000, Krustev, 2006, Langlois and Langlois, 2009, Ramsay, 2008, Regan and Stam, 2000, Shannon et al, 2010, Slantchev, 2004, Stanley and Sawyer, 2009] and the durability of peace after and/or before conflict (i.e., conflict onset and recurrence) [e.g., Fortna, 2003, Gibler and Tir, 2010, Glassmyer and Sambanis, 2008, Grieco, 2001, Lo et al, 2008, Quackenbush and Venteicher, 2008, Senese and Quackenbush, 2003, Tir, 2003, Werner, 1999, Werner and Yuen, 2005.…”

“…Although some efforts have been made to investigate the connection between survival of peace and survival of conflict [e.g., Shannon et al, 2010, Wucherpfennig, 2011, little research has been undertaken to look at the whole life span of conflict in a coherent framework. We offer an approach to predict the onset, termination, and recurrence of violent conflict in a unified model.…”

Institutional Opposition, Regime Accountability, and International Conflict

“…First, since our causal mechanism pertains to the position of an IO in an ongoing military crisis, we collected data for a variable that captures whether an IO opposed the escalation of a territorial dispute by a challenger. This is a significant departure from the existing empirical studies that use a joint membership variable to assess the effect of IOs on conflict initiation and duration (Boehmer, Gartzke & Nordstrom 2004;Shannon, Morey & Boehmke 2010;Bearce & Omori 2005;Haftel 2007; Pevehouse & Russett 2006). Second, we develop a new statistical method to account for the potential endogeneity of an IO's opposition to a militarized dispute.…”