The connection between domestic politics and international cooperation, specifically the relationship between regime type and alliance behavior, is examined to test two central hypotheses: democracies are more likely to ally with each other, and states of any similar regime type are more likely to ally with each other. These hypotheses emerge from three theories: constructivism, economic interdependence, and credible commitments. The authors use a data set of all pairs of states from 1816 to 1992. Results show that states with similar regime type are more likely to ally with each other after 1945, although two democracies are not more likely to ally than two autocracies during this period, and distance, learning, threat, and common culture affect alliance behavior, but trade does not. Results indicate sharp limits to the connection between democracy and international cooperation.

One central element of the current war on terrorism is “draining the swamps,” addressing conditions within a state that produce international terrorism. This paper empirically examines what factors lead a state to become a “swamp,” drawing on a theoretical approach that guides current U.S. policy. This theory looks at the ability of a state to impose costs on terrorist groups within its own borders. The lower the operating costs within a state, the greater the amount of terrorism produced within that state. Using data on the number of international terrorist events originating from a state from 1968 to 1998, an empirical model incorporating variables designed to test this theoretical argument as well as relevant control variables is employed. Strong support was found for the state strength approach, suggesting that one way to address the threat of international terrorism is to strengthen a government's ability to control its own territory.

What are the most important sources of institutional variation among authoritarian regimes, and how do such institutions influence these dictatorships' propensity to initiate military disputes? This article argues that most existing studies in both comparative politics and international relations employ a flawed conceptualization of authoritarian institutions. Excessive focus on the personalization or institutionalization of authoritarian regimes' decision-making procedures has distracted attention from the more critical issue of what institutions these regimes deploy to enhance social control and secure political incumbency. Since military regimes are systematically less effective than single-party regimes at developing these types of authoritarian institutions, they more frequently resort to desperate measures to fend off domestic challenges to their power. In particular, we find compelling empirical support for our hypothesis that military regimes are more likely than single-party regimes to initiate military disputes, irrespective of whether those regimes are highly personalized or not. S tates fight wars, but governments in power make the fateful decision whether or not to start them. Warfare thus results not merely from what students of international relations have tended to see as the benchmark interest of states: maximizing relative gains in a Hobbesian world (i.e., Waltz 1979). It also arises from what students of comparative politics typically argue is the benchmark interest of government officials: staying in power (i.e., Bates 1981). Since prospects for retaining power are influenced by domestic political institutions, we expect such institutions to exhibit a powerful effect on the conflict propensity of different types of governments.Unfortunately, we still know much too little about how or even which institutions make governments more or less likely to initiate military disputes. This problem is particularly acute in our study of authoritarian regimes. There is considerable scholarly consensus that dictatorships are more likely than democracies to instigate wars; but why are some dictatorships more belligerent than others? Like many students of the democratic peace, we argue that variation in international aggression arises from variation in domestic political institutions. But what are the most important sources of institutional variation among authoritarian regimes? And how do such institutions influence these dictatorships' propensity to initiate military disputes?We address these questions by applying a novel institutional typology of authoritarian regimes to the question of militarized dispute initiation (Slater 2003). We argue that authoritarian institutions influence conflict propensity through their effect on regime legitimacy and government tenure. The less legitimate the regime and the less secure the government in power, the more likely the political leadership will be to initiate military conflict.We argue further that the critical institutional factor influencing an authoritarian regime...

This study examines the negative effects of civil wars and the post-civil war environment on educational expenditures and enrollment. Two causal mechanisms are considered. First, civil wars are likely to destroy a state's system of education through the loss of infrastructure and personnel. Second, a less deleterious cause may be the drawing away of funds for increased military expenditures to fight the civil war. Using UNESCO education data, the authors examine the percent change in educational expenditures and primary, secondary, and tertiary enrollment for all states from 1980 through 1997. The authors use a measure of when a state is in a civil war, a dynamic post-civil war measure, an interaction with military spending, and relevant control variables. The results indicate strong support for the notion that civil war is devastating for a system of education, as both expenditures and enrollment decline during periods of civil war. No support was found for the reallocation of education funds towards military spending during a civil war. These results highlight the importance of addressing the social costs of a civil war. Civil wars do not simply impose social costs because of increased funding to the military; rather, they severely disrupt a state's ability to provide even basic social services.

The current literature examining US foreign assistance goals in the post-Cold War period has found that security is declining in importance and that the USA is aiding democracies while also supporting abusers of human rights. This article examines a previously untested neorealist hypothesis about the changing nature of US security goals following the end of the Cold War. Security for the USA, according to neorealists, is changing as the distribution of power changes. This paper also tests hypotheses about different liberal goals the USA might pursue. Finally, this article uses more appropriate and novel methods to test these models, including analysis of what determines when a state initially gets aid and what their initial aid allocation is. Unlike previous studies, security is found to still be important but changing as the balance of power changes after the end of the Cold War. Also, human rights abusers are likely to receive less aid. Finally, this article demonstrates that the econometric methods used to analyze foreign aid data play a large role in discerning what factors actually affect aid decisions.