Recent research shows individuals' identification with in-groups to be psychologically important and socially consequential. However, there is little agreement about how identification should be conceptualized or measured. On the basis of previous work, the authors identified 5 specific components of in-group identification and offered a hierarchical 2-dimensional model within which these components are organized. Studies 1 and 2 used confirmatory factor analysis to validate the proposed model of self-definition (individual self-stereotyping, in-group homogeneity) and self-investment (solidarity, satisfaction, and centrality) dimensions, across 3 different group identities. Studies 3 and 4 demonstrated the construct validity of the 5 components by examining their (concurrent) correlations with established measures of in-group identification. Studies 5-7 demonstrated the predictive and discriminant validity of the 5 components by examining their (prospective) prediction of individuals' orientation to, and emotions about, real intergroup relations. Together, these studies illustrate the conceptual and empirical value of a hierarchical multicomponent model of in-group identification.

Insights from appraisal theories of emotion are used to integrate elements of theories on collective action. Three experiments with disadvantaged groups systematically manipulated procedural fairness (Study 1), emotional social support (Study 2), and instrumental social support (Study 3) to examine their effects on collective action tendencies through group-based anger and group efficacy. Results of structural equation modeling showed that procedural fairness and emotional social support affected the group-based anger pathway (reflecting emotion-focused coping), whereas instrumental social support affected the group efficacy pathway (reflecting problem-focused coping), constituting 2 distinct pathways to collective action tendencies. Analyses of the means suggest that collective action tendencies become stronger the more fellow group members "put their money where their mouth is." The authors discuss how their dual pathway model integrates and extends elements of current approaches to collective action.

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In two studies, the authors investigated guilt as a response to group-based advantage. Consistent with its conceptualization as a self-focused emotion, White guilt was based in self-focused beliefs in racial inequality. Thus, guilt was associated with belief in White privilege (Study 1) and resulted from seeing European Americans as perpetrators of racial discrimination (Study 2). Just as personal guilt is associated with efforts at restitution, White guilt was predictive of support for affirmative action programs aimed at compensating African Americans. White guilt was not, however, predictive of support for noncompensatory efforts at promoting equality, such as affirmative action programs that increase opportunities (Study 2). In contrast, the other-focused emotion of group-based sympathy was a more general predictor of support for different affirmative action policies. Our findings demonstrate the benefits and limits of group-based guilt as a basis of support for social equality and highlight the value of understanding the specific emotions elicited in intergroup contexts.

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Three studies examined non-Aboriginal Australians' guilt and anger about their ingroup's advantage over structurally disadvantaged Aborigines. Study 1 showed that participants who perceived their ingroup as relatively advantaged perceived this inequality as unfair and felt guilt and anger about it. Anger, and to a lesser degree guilt, predicted the willingness to engage in political action regarding ingroup advantage. Study 2 showed both guilt and anger to be relatively self-focused because both were associated with appraising the ingroup's (rather than the government's) discrimination as responsible for ingroup advantage. Study 3 examined on participants especially willing to engage in political action to bring about systemic compensation to Aborigines. Anger about ingroup advantage was a potent predictor. Although guilt was associated with the abstract goal of systemic compensation, guilt did not explain willingness for political action. Results underline the importance of examining specific group-based emotions in intergroup relations.

Moral failure is thought to damage self-image when people appraise it as indicating a global self-defect. This appraisal is thought to be associated with the feeling of shame and thus self-defensive motivation. However, a damaged social image better explains self-defensive motivation to hide from and avoid others. Based on an integrative review of theory and research, we offer a conceptual model of how concern for self-image and social image guides the experience of moral failure. The model distinguishes the appraisals (of self-defect and other-condemnation) and feelings (of rejection, inferiority, and shame) embedded in the shame concept. Concern for a damaged social image is represented in an other-condemnation → rejection combination, whereas concern for a damaged self-image is represented in a (global) self-defect → inferiority combination. As these appraisal-feeling combinations are concerned with damage done to one's image, they should be linked to self-defensive motivation. As the (specific) self-defect → shame combination is concerned with a repairable defect in self-image, it should be linked with self-improvement motivation. Thus, our model explains why "shame" is sometimes tied to self-defensive motivation and sometimes tied to self-improvement motivation after moral failure.

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