Recently, a multinomial process tree model was developed to measure an agent’s consequence sensitivity, norm sensitivity, and generalized inaction/action preferences when making moral decisions (CNI model). However, the CNI model presupposed that an agent considers consequences—norms—generalized inaction/action preferences sequentially, which is untenable based on recent evidence. Besides, the CNI model generates parameters at the group level based on binary categorical data. Hence, the C/N/I parameters cannot be used for correlation analyses or other conventional research designs. To solve these limitations, we developed the CAN algorithm to compute norm and consequence sensitivities and overall action/inaction preferences algebraically in a parallel manner. We re-analyzed the raw data of the original CNI model to test the methodological predictions. Our results demonstrate that: (1) the C parameter is approximately equal between the CNI model and CAN algorithm; (2) the N parameter under the CNI model approximately equals N/(1 − C) under the CAN algorithm; (3) the I parameter and A parameter are reversed around 0.5 – the larger the I parameter, the more the generalized inaction versus action preference and the larger the A parameter, the more overall action versus inaction preference; (4) tests of differences in parameters between groups with the CNI model and CAN algorithm led to almost the same statistical conclusion; (5) parameters from the CAN algorithm can be used for correlational analyses and multiple comparisons, and this is an advantage over the parameters from the CNI model. The theoretical and methodological implications of our study were also discussed.

Our aim was to identify the relationships between self-esteem and social adaptation, and the chain mediating effect of peer trust and perceived social support in this relationship. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, Peer Trust Scale, Perceived Social Support Scale, and Scale on Social Adaptability for Secondary School Students were integrated into a paper-and-pencil survey. Participants were 400 adolescents in southwestern China. Results demonstrated that the relationship between self-esteem and social adaptation was partially mediated by peer trust and perceived social support. The results were explained using the ecological systems theory. Self-esteem is inside the core individual; peer trust is in the microsystem and/or mesosystem; perceived social support is in the mesosystem, exosystem, and/or macrosystem. Adolescent social adaptation could be promoted by directly enhancing self-esteem, thus indirectly improving peer trust and perceived social support.

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The CNI model generates C, N, and I parameters to measure people’s mental processes—consequence sensitivity (C), norm sensitivity (N), and generalized inaction/action preferences (I)—in moral decision making. Given the limitations of the CNI model, the CAN algorithm was developed to depict the consequence sensitivity (C), overall action versus inaction preferences (A), norm sensitivity (N), and perverse responses with the other three parameters. However, no studies have clarified whether and how the CAN algorithm can solve the limitations of the CNI model. The present study systematically uncovers the limitations of the CNI model and the solutions provided by the CAN algorithm: (a) the CNI model does not consider negative values of the parameters, but the CAN algorithm does; (b) the sequential processing assumption of the CNI model is biased, the CAN algorithm proposes a parallel calculation strategy to fix this problem; (c) the calculation of the I parameter of the CNI model is inaccurate, so the CAN algorithm proposes the A parameter to replace it; (d) the CNI model has a problem measuring perverse responses, while the CAN algorithm develops three parameters to measure these. We examined some of our points on the basis of a reanalysis of the foreign language effect (FLE) by comparing the parameters from the CAN algorithm with those from the CNI model. We found that consequence and norm sensitivity were estimated to be greater using the CNI model than with the CAN algorithm. Consequently, these overestimations significantly (consequence sensitivity) and marginally (norm sensitivity) interfered with the FLE, making the FLE more likely to return a false positive result. In addition, the CAN algorithm was able to measure the extent of perverse responses, indicating that foreign language (compared to a native language) leads to more perverse responses. The present study demonstrates that the CNI model magnifies the Type I error of conclusions and that the CAN algorithm (compared to the CNI model) provides more insights regarding moral decision making.

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The spatial updating and memory systems are employed during updating in both the immediate and retrieved environments. However, these dual systems seem to work differently, as the difference of pointing latency and absolute error between the two systems vary across environments. To verify this issue, the present study employed the bias analysis of signed errors based on the hypothesis that the transformed representation will bias toward the original one. Participants learned a spatial layout and then either stayed in the learning location or were transferred to a neighboring room directly or after being disoriented. After that, they performed spatial judgments from perspectives aligned with the learning direction, aligned with the direction they faced during the test, or a novel direction misaligned with the two above-mentioned directions. The patterns of signed error bias were consistent across environments. Responses for memory aligned perspectives were unbiased, whereas responses for sensorimotor aligned perspectives were biased away from the memory aligned perspective, and responses for misaligned perspectives were biased toward sensorimotor aligned perspectives. These findings indicate that the spatial updating system is consistently independent of the spatial memory system regardless of the environments, but the updating system becomes less accessible as the environment changes from immediate to a retrieved one.

Previous studies have demonstrated the possibility that when people are in standing rather than sitting postures, they have a stronger cognitive control propensity, making them inclined to agree more to sacrificing one innocent person and saving more people. Furthermore, this postural effect can be moderated by dual processes. In three studies, participants read dilemma scenarios followed by a proposed behavior to sacrifice one innocent person and save five or more people. The participants in sitting or standing postures were asked whether the described action was morally acceptable (moral judgment) and whether they would perform the described action (moral action). The results demonstrated that participants were more approving of the behavioral proposal in the moral action perspective than in the moral judgment perspective across the three studies. The hypothesized postural effect was found in a field study (Study 1) and replicated in a preregistered replication study (Study 2), and was further supported in an experimental study (Study 3). Compared with those in sitting postures, participants in standing postures expressed higher approval of the behavioral proposal compared to their sitting counterparts. Furthermore, the postural effect was dismissed when participants made moral decisions with a dual task to increase cognitive load, and it was reversed when they made moral decisions after deliberate consideration of the behavioral proposal (Study 3). The present research supports and extends the dual‐process morality theory by demonstrating that body posture can affect moral decision‐making; it also offers novel evidence revealing the moderating role of dual process on embodiment effects. It enriches our knowledge that morality is evolutionarily embodied in postures and that the dual process can moderate embodiment effects.

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