The Bayesian approach to quantum mechanics of Caves, Fuchs and Schack is presented. Its conjunction of realism about physics along with antirealism about much of the structure of quantum theory is elaborated; and the position defended from common objections: that it is solipsist; that it is too instrumentalist; that it cannot deal with Wigner's friend scenarios. Three more substantive problems are raised: Can a reasonable ontology be found for the approach? Can it account for explanation in quantum theory? Are subjective probabilities on their own adequate in the quantum domain? The first question is answered in the affirmative, drawing on elements from Nancy Cartwright's philosophy of science. The second two are not: it is argued that these present outstanding difficulties for the project. A quantum Bayesian version of Moore's paradox is developed to illustrate difficulties with the subjectivist account of pure state assignments.

What ontology does realism about the quantum state suggest? The main extant view in contemporary philosophy of physics is wave-function realism. We elaborate the sense in which wave-function realism does provide an ontological picture; and defend it from certain objections that have been raised against it. However, there are good reasons to be dissatisfied with wave-function realism, as we go on to elaborate. This motivates the development of an opposing picture: what we call spacetime state realism; a view which takes the states associated to spacetime regions as fundamental. This approach enjoys a number of beneficial features, although, unlike wave-function realism, it involves non-separability at the level of fundamental ontology. We investigate the pros and cons of this non-separability, arguing that it is a quite acceptable feature; even one which proves fruitful in the context of relativistic covariance. A companion paper discusses the prospects for combining a spacetime-based ontology with separability, along lines suggested by Deutsch and Hayden

of Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of PhilosophyThis thesis is a contribution to the debate on the implications of quantum information theory for the foundational problems of quantum mechanics. In Part I an attempt is made to shed some light on the nature of information and quantum information theory. It is emphasized that the everyday notion of information is to be firmly distinguished from the technical notions arising in information theory;however it is maintained that in both settings 'information' functions as an abstract noun, hence does not refer to a particular or substance. The popular claim 'Information is Physical' is assessed and it is argued that this proposition faces a destructive dilemma. Accordingly, the slogan may not be understood as an ontological claim, but at best, as a methodological one. A novel argument is provided against Dretske's (1981) attempt to base a semantic notion of information on ideas from information theory.The function of various measures of information content for quantum systems is explored and the applicability of the Shannon information in the quantum context maintained against the challenge of Brukner and Zeilinger (2001). The phenomenon of quantum teleportation is then explored as a case study serving to emphasize the value of recognising the logical status of 'information' as an abstract noun: it is argued that the conceptual puzzles often associated with this phenomenon result from the familiar error of hypostatizing an abstract noun.The approach of Deutsch and Hayden (2000) to the questions of locality and information flow in entangled quantum systems is assessed. It is suggested that the approach suffers from an equivocation between a conservative and an ontological reading; and the differing implications of each is examined. Some results are presented on the characterization of entanglement in the Deutsch-Hayden formalism.Part I closes with a discussion of some philosophical aspects of quantum computation.In particular, it is argued against Deutsch that the Church-Turing hypothesis is not underwritten by a physical principle, the Turing Principle. Some general morals are drawn concerning the nature of quantum information theory.In Part II, attention turns to the question of the implications of quantum information theory for our understanding of the meaning of the quantum formalism. Following some preliminary remarks, two particular information-theoretic approaches to the foundations of quantum mechanics are assessed in detail. It is argued that Zeilinger's (1999) Foundational Principle is unsuccessful as a foundational principle for quantum mechanics. The information-theoretic characterization theorem of Clifton, is assessed more favourably, but the generality of the approach is questioned and it is argued that the implications of the theorem for the traditional foundational problems in quantum mechanics remains obscure.

Recently, Brukner and Zeilinger (2001) have claimed that the Shannon information is not well defined as a measure of information in quantum mechanics, adducing arguments that seek to show that it is inextricably tied to classical notions of measurement. It is shown here that these arguments do not succeed: the Shannon information does not have problematic ties to classical concepts. In a further argument, Brukner and Zeilinger compare the Shannon information unfavourably to their preferred information measure, I( p), with regard to the definition of a notion of 'total information content'. This argument is found unconvincing and the relationship between individual measures of information and notions of 'total information content' investigated. We close by considering the prospects of Zeilinger's Foundational Principle as a foundational principle for quantum mechanics * christopher.timpson@queens.ox.ac.uk

The distinction between proper and improper mixtures is a staple of the discussion of foundational questions in quantum mechanics. Here we note an analogous distinction in the context of the theory of entanglement. The terminology of 'proper' versus 'improper' separability is proposed to mark the distinction.

Deutsch and Hayden claim to have provided an account of quantum mechanics which is particularly local, and which clarifies the nature of information transmission in entangled quantum systems. In this paper, a perspicuous description of their formalism is offered and their claim assessed. It proves essential to distinguish, as Deutsch and Hayden do not, between two ways of interpreting the formalism. On the first, conservative, interpretation, no benefits with respect to locality accrue that are not already available on either an Everettian or a statistical interpretation; and the conclusions regarding information flow are equivocal. The second, ontological, interpretation, offers a framework with the novel feature that global properties of quantum systems are reduced to local ones; but no conclusions follow concerning information flow in more standard quantum mechanics.

The principle of relativity is a principle that narrows the possibilities; it is not a model, just as the second law of thermodynamics is not a model. Albert Einstein 1 AbstractIn a comparison of the principles of special relativity and of quantum mechanics, the former theory is marked by its relative economy and apparent explanatory simplicity. A number of theorists have thus been led to search for a small number of postulates-essentially information theoretic in nature-that would play the role in quantum mechanics that the relativity principle and the light postulate jointly play in Einstein's 1905 special relativity theory. The purpose of the present paper is to resist this idea, at least in so far as it is supposed to reveal the fundamental form of the theory. It is argued that the methodology of Einstein's 1905 theory represents a victory of pragmatism over explanatory depth; and that its adoption only made sense in the context of the chaotic state state of physics at the start of the 20th century-as Einstein well knew.

Between 1964 and 1990, the notion of nonlocality in Bell's papers underwent a profound change as his nonlocality theorem gradually became detached from quantum mechanics, and referred to wider probabilistic theories involving correlations between separated beables. The proposition that standard quantum mechanics is itself nonlocal (more precisely, that it violates 'local causality') became divorced from the Bell theorem per se from 1976 on, although this important point is widely overlooked in the literature. In 1990, the year of his death, Bell would express serious misgivings about the mathematical form of the local causality condition, and leave ill-defined the issue of the consistency between special relativity and violation of the Bell-type inequality. In our view, the significance of the Bell theorem, both in its deterministic and stochastic forms, can only be fully understood by taking into account the fact that a fully Lorentzcovariant version of quantum theory, free of action-at-a-distance, can be articulated in the Everett interpretation. * harvey.brown@philosophy.ox.ac.uk