Why Special Relativity Should Not Be a Template for a Fundamental Reformulation of Quantum Mechanics

Abstract

The principle of relativity is a principle that narrows the possibilities; it is not a model, just as the second law of thermodynamics is not a model. Albert Einstein 1 AbstractIn a comparison of the principles of special relativity and of quantum mechanics, the former theory is marked by its relative economy and apparent explanatory simplicity. A number of theorists have thus been led to search for a small number of postulates-essentially information theoretic in nature-that would play the role in quantum mechanics that the relativity principle and the light postulate jointly play in Einstein's 1905 special relativity theory. The purpose of the present paper is to resist this idea, at least in so far as it is supposed to reveal the fundamental form of the theory. It is argued that the methodology of Einstein's 1905 theory represents a victory of pragmatism over explanatory depth; and that its adoption only made sense in the context of the chaotic state state of physics at the start of the 20th century-as Einstein well knew.

How device-independent approaches change the meaning of physical theory

“…Special relativity is not a constructive theory, i.e., it remains mute on the issue of material constitution of the rods and clocks that act as its measurement devices. Einstein believed that this lack of constructivity was a disadvantage and, consequently, principle theories did not offer a satisfactory understanding of physics [20]. He kept hoping that a constructive theory could provide a better understanding of Nature: "When we say we have succeeded in understanding a group of natural processes, we invariably mean that a constructive theory has been found which covers the processes in question" [36].…”

The effectiveness of mathematics in physics of the unknown

“…There is good evidence that Einstein believed that this lack of constructivity was a disadvantage and that principle theories did not offer a satisfactory understanding of physics [11,24]. This claim has been challenged recently via a comparison with James Jeans's position [32] but another, more seasoned critique focuses on the status of general relativity.…”

The Measurement Problem from the Perspective of an Information-Theoretic Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

“…Harvey Brown and Chris Timpson [7] have criticized my earlier remarks [8][9][10] along these lines, particularly with reference to the Clifton-Bub-Halvorson result [11] that the observables and state space of a theory formulated in C * -algebraic terms must be quantum mechanical if the theory satisfies certain information-theoretic constraints. Briefly, the critique focuses on my reference to Einstein's distinction between principle and constructive theories, and the claim that quantum mechanics, like special relativity, should be understood as a principle theory, where the principles concern space-time structure in the case of relativity, and information-theoretic structure in the case of quantum mechanics:…”

“…-Harvey Brown and Chris Timpson ( [7], p. 6) Quantum mechanics was born with Heisenberg's seminal 1925 "Umdeutung" paper [12] "On the quantum-theoretical re-interpretation [Umdeutung] of kinematical and mechanical relations". Heisenberg thought that the discrete orbits of Bohr's atomic theory were an artificial theoretical fix that "saved the appearances", but this was not the right way to think about the structural features of atoms responsible for the emission and absorption spectra of gases.…”