The neural correlates for retention of visual information in visual short-term memory are considered separate from those of sensory encoding. However, recent findings suggest that sensory areas may play a role also in short-term memory. We investigated the functional relevance, spatial specificity, and temporal characteristics of human early visual cortex in the consolidation of capacity-limited topographic visual memory using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Topographically specific TMS pulses were delivered over lateralized occipital cortex at 100, 200, or 400 ms into the retention phase of a modified change detection task with low or high memory loads. For the high but not the low memory load, we found decreased memory performance for memory trials in the visual field contralateral, but not ipsilateral to the side of TMS, when pulses were delivered at 200 ms into the retention interval. A behavioral version of the TMS experiment, in which a distractor stimulus (memory mask) replaced the TMS pulses, further corroborated these findings. Our findings suggest that retinotopic visual cortex contributes to the short-term consolidation of topographic visual memory during early stages of the retention of visual information. Further, TMS-induced interference decreased the strength (amplitude) of the memory representation, which most strongly affected the high memory load trials.

Aphantasia, i.e., the congenital inability to experience voluntary mental imagery, offers a new model for studying the functional role of mental imagery in (visual) cognition. However, until now, there have been no studies investigating whether aphantasia can be linked to specific impairments in cognitive functioning. Here, we assess visual working memory performance in an aphantasic individual. We find that she performs significantly worse than controls on the most difficult (i.e., requiring the highest degree of precision) visual working memory trials. Surprisingly, her performance on a task designed to involve mental imagery did not differ from controls', although she lacked metacognitive insight into her performance. Together, these results indicate that although a lack of mental imagery can be compensated for under some conditions, mental imagery has a functional role in other areas of visual cognition, one of which is high-precision working memory.

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The neurobiological processes underlying mental imagery are a matter of debate and controversy among neuroscientists, cognitive psychologists, philosophers, and biologists. Recent neuroimaging studies demonstrated that the execution of mental imagery activates large frontoparietal and occipitotemporal networks in the human brain. These previous imaging studies, however, neglected the crucial interplay within and across the widely distributed cortical networks of activated brain regions. Here, we combined time-resolved eventrelated functional magnetic resonance imaging with analyses of interactions between brain regions (functional and effective brain connectivity) to unravel the premotor-parietal dynamics underlying spatial imagery. Participants had to sequentially construct and spatially transform a mental visual object based on either verbal or visual instructions. By concurrently accounting for the full spatiotemporal pattern of brain activity and network connectivity, we functionally segregated an early from a late premotor-parietal imagery network. Moreover, we revealed that the modality-specific information upcoming from sensory brain regions is first sent to the premotor cortex and then to the medial-dorsal parietal cortex, i.e., top-down from the motor to the perceptual pole during spatial imagery. Importantly, we demonstrate that the premotor cortex serves as the central relay station, projecting to parietal cortex at two functionally distinct stages during spatial imagery. Our approach enabled us to disentangle the multicomponential cognitive construct of mental imagery into its different cognitive subelements. We discuss and explicitly assign these mental subprocesses to each of the revealed effective brain connectivity networks and present an integrative neurobiological model of spatial imagery.

Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is widely used in experimental brain research to manipulate brain activity in humans. Next to the intended neural effects, every TMS pulse produces a distinct clicking sound and sensation on the head which can also influence task performance. This necessitates careful consideration of control conditions in order to ensure that behavioral effects of interest can be attributed to the neural consequences of TMS and not to non-neural effects of a TMS pulse. Surprisingly, even though these non-neural effects of TMS are largely unknown, they are often assumed to be unspecific, i.e. not dependent on TMS parameters. This assumption is inherent to many control strategies in TMS research but has recently been challenged on empirical grounds. Here, we further develop the empirical basis of control strategies in TMS research. We investigated the time-dependence and task-dependence of the non-neural effects of TMS and compared real and sham TMS over vertex. Critically, we show that non-neural TMS effects depend on a complex interplay of these factors. Although TMS had no direct neural effects, both pre- and post-stimulus TMS time windows modulated task performance on both a sensory detection task and a cognitive angle judgment task. For the most part, these effects were quantitatively similar across tasks but effect sizes were clearly different. Moreover, the effects of real and sham TMS were almost identical with interesting exceptions that shed light on the relative contribution of auditory and somato-sensory aspects of a TMS pulse. Knowledge of such effects is of critical importance for the interpretation of TMS experiments and helps deciding what constitutes an appropriate control condition. Our results broaden the empirical basis of control strategies in TMS research and point at potential pitfalls that should be avoided.

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We address the issue of how visual information stored in working memory (WM) is introspected. In other words, how do we become aware of WM content in order to consciously examine or manipulate it? Influential models of WM have suggested that WM representations are either conscious by definition, or directly accessible for conscious inspection. We propose that WM introspection does not operate on the actual memory trace but rather requires a new representation to be created for the conscious domain. This conscious representation exists in addition and in parallel to the actual memory representation. The existence of such a separate representation is revealed by and reflected in the qualitatively different functional characteristics between the actual memory trace and its conscious experience, and their distinct interactions within external visual input. Our model differs from state-based models in that WM introspection does not involve a change in the state of WM content, but rather involves the creation of a new, second representation existing in parallel to the original memory trace.

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